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Tuesday, January 26, 2021

Former President Donald J. Trump Should File a Declaratory Judgment Action and Not a Quo Warranto Action

 

Former President Donald J. Trump Should File a Declaratory Judgment Action and Not a Quo Warranto Action

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

January 26, 2021


Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause


Regarding former President Donald J. Trump’s impeachment, Leo Donofrio, Esq. has adopted many of the suggestions that I have outlined in my two articles, “President Trump Must Immediately File A Declaratory Judgment Action to Vindicate Himself and Put an End to the Election Controversy and New Impeachment” (Jan. 11, 2021)  and “President Trump Needs to Make His Impeachment Defense First In Court Before Making It In the Senate” (Jan. 17, 2021).  See Donofrio’s article, “Trump Must Bring Quo Warranto Action as Complete Defense to Impeachment” (Jan. 23, 2021). Where I part company with Donofrio is in his reliance on quo warranto as a legal avenue for Trump to follow for defending himself in the upcoming Senate impeachment trial and for ousting President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris from office.

Donofrio wants Trump to bring a quo warranto action under 16 D.C.Code §§ 3501-3548 in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia as a means to defend himself against the impeachment and remove Biden and Harris from the offices they currently occupy. Donofrio maintains that quo warranto is the exclusive remedy available to defend accomplish that.  He maintains that the DC District Court is the only court in the United States where such an action may be brought. I will now demonstrate that Trump following Donofrio’s advice and putting all his eggs in the quo warranto basket would be a grave mistake.

At common law, a private person had no right to bring a quo warranto action. Under the common law, only the United States can bring a quo warranto action. Wallace v. Anderson, 18 U.S. 5 Wheat. 291, 292 (1820). Congress can, however, pass a statute allowing a private person to bring such an action. Johnson v. Manhattan Railway Co., 289 U.S. 479 (1933). Congress has done so, and the D.C. statute is the only statute passed by Congress that permits such a procedure. Blackburn v. O’Brien, 289 F.Supp. 289 (D.C.W.D.Va. 1968). A quo warranto action is a direct attack on an officeholder, questioning his or her qualifications to hold an office and therefore his or her warrant and authority to occupy that office. Donofrio fails to recognize the many problems that exist with the quo warranto procedure that he advocates. The DC District Code presents not only a cumbersome procedure that has to be followed, but its very text shows that it is not applicable to a sitting president and vice president.  Additionally, even if it could be successfully argued that it is so applicable, it would be unconstitutional.

Neither the U.S. Attorney General nor the U.S. Attorney will help Trump

Under § 16-3502, only the Attorney General of the United States or the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia can initiate a proceeding for issuance of a writ of quo warranto “on his own motion or on the relation of a third person.” “[A] quo warranto action against a public official may be brought only by the Attorney General or the U.S. Attorney.” Taitz v. Obama,707 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  If the writ is brought on behalf of a third person, it may only issue by leave of the District Court for the District of Columbia.  D.C. Code § 16-3502.  “If the Attorney General or United States attorney refuses to institute a quo warranto proceeding on the request of a person interested, the interested person may apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ issued.”  § 16-3503. 

Hence, the quo warranto procedure starts by requiring that the quo warranto writ issue in the name of the United States. It compels a concerned citizen to apply to the Attorney General or the United States Attorney to bring the action on his behalf in the District Court for the District of Columbia (16 D.C. Code §§ 3501-3502). These officials have broad discretion. It is not realistic that they would file a quo warranto action in the name of the United States against a sitting president, their own boss and the same person who appointed them. It is also unrealistic that they would file such an action in a case in which among the list of defendants may be the House of Representatives, Senate, and the whole Congress.  Even appointing a special prosecutor would present a problem, for who would appoint him or her? We have already seen how the Executive and Congressional branches of government are both defending Biden’s stance that he has been constitutionally elected president.  The Justice Department has dismissed out of hand any challenge to the Biden election. How does Donofrio expect to get any cooperation from either of these two branches of government which he would need to sanction and support his quo warranto action?

The court would probably not give its permission for Trump to have the quo warranto writ issued 

The D.C. statute provides a private litigant with a mechanism by which he or she can still bring a quo warranto action even if the government refuses to do so. If these government officials refuse to institute a quo warranto proceeding, only an “interested person” may petition the court for leave to have the writ issued in the name of the United States on the relation of the “interested person.” § 3503. The court has broad discretion to deny the writ. Under the standard for being an “interested person” as pronounced by Newman v. United States ex rel. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537 (1915), in a case involving a public office one would have to have “an interest in the office itself peculiar to himself” and be filing an action against another who allegedly usurped that office. Indeed, Newman requires that the plaintiff be “actually and personally interested” in the office and that there be another person against whom the action is brought who has unlawfully occupied the office in question. In other words, the plaintiff must himself make a claim to the office to qualify to bring the action. Even if the quo warranto plaintiff could show that he was an “interested person,” which Trump would have no problem showing, the court still has to grant him its permission to bring the quo warranto action.

Neither the president nor vice president is an officer of the United States

The court would most likely rule that the statute does not apply to removing a sitting president or vice president because they are not “Officers of the United States” under the statute. § 3503 provides that for who are the persons against whom the quo warranto writ may issue. It states that the writ can issue “against a person who within the District of Columbia usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or military.”  The impeachment clause of the Constitution does not consider the offices of president and vice president as offices of the United States. Article II, Section 4 provides:  “The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Note that the sentence does not say “all other” civil Officers of the United States.  For example, members of Congress are not civil officers subject to impeachment and removal.  See “Impeachable Offenses: Early Historical Practice (1789–1860).” Notwithstanding the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3 which does separately list “Senator or Representative in Congress” apart from “any office, civil or military,” but does not separately list the president or vice president, the president would also not be found to be a civil officer subject to the quo warranto statute. Congress in passing the D.C. statute did provide private litigants with a statutory mechanism for bringing quo warranto actions in the DC District Court, but it did not intend for it to apply to ousting sitting Presidents. Under the Appointments Clause (Article II, Sec. 2, cl. 2), it is the president that is given the power to make, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appointments of “Officers of the United States” and other positions that are not considered inferior. Given the president’s power to fill these offices and the impeachment mechanism existing in the Constitution, it is doubtful that Congress meant to include the Office of the President itself, which appoints those officers, when it wrote “public office of the United States” in § 16-3501.

The court would not rule that Biden and Harris have usurped their offices

Under § 3501, the plaintiff must prove that the person holding the contested office “usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises, a franchise conferred by the United States or a public office of the United States, civil or military.”  Can we reasonably expect the DC District Court to give its permission to a plaintiff to bring an action against Biden and Harris who Congress just recently confirmed as the president and vice president of the United States on January 6, 2021 and who were  sworn into their offices on January 20, 2021, for the purpose of asking the court to issue a ruling that they have usurped their offices? On the contrary, the court can use that process to hold that the issue of Biden’s and Harris’s election has already been constitutionally decided by Congress, is moot, and therefore deny the application for the writ as a matter of law. Congress’s final determination followed by both Biden and Harris being sworn into their offices is binding upon a court. It does not appear that the Constitution provides any way to undo any of that.         

A quo warranto action does not extend to the issue of whether Trump’s speech legally caused the Capitol invasion

The quo warranto action would only extend to the question of whether Biden and Harris lawfully occupy their officers (which as I have stated is now moot in the eyes of a court).  It would, however, not extend to the question of whether Trump's speech on January 6, 2021, is a legal cause of the illegal entry into the Capitol. This is a critical issue that Trump has to pursue.  If Trump’s speech did not legally cause the invasion of the Capitol, then there is no legal basis to the Article of Impeachment. 

For all these textual, procedural, and substantive reasons, a quo warranto action would not help Trump in any way. 

The quo warranto statute would be unconstitutional if it could be applied to a sitting president or vice president

But there is a more serious problem with what Donofrio proposes and that is one of constitutional dimensions. Donofrio claims that Congress has delegated its powers to remove a sitting president to the D.C, District Court by passing the D.C. District Code statute. As written and only interpreting it as though the Office of the President or Vice President are not included in its sweep, the D.C. statute would pass constitutional muster. On the other hand, if the D.C. statute was to be read as Donofrio does, to be used as a tool to oust from office a sitting president or vice president, then such an application of the statute would be unconstitutional.

It is highly doubtful that Congress, a co-equal branch of government to the Executive, has the constitutional power to pass a statute that would allow a federal district court to alone directly remove a sitting president or vice president. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 (1803) (shows that Congress in enacting laws must do so within the confines of power given to it in the Constitution and held that Congress had no power to give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction in cases not described in the Constitution). Surely, if Congress cannot give the Supreme Court power which the Constitution does not give to that Court, Congress also cannot give to a federal district court any power not belonging to it under the Constitution.

§ 3504 provides that the court remedy of a quo warranto action includes a judgment that “he be ousted and excluded” from the illegally occupied office.  But the Constitution itself textually provides how to remove a sitting president and vice president and Congress has no constitutional authority to legislate a different way to do it. See Article I, Section 8 which prescribes the legislative powers given to Congress. The Constitution itself does not give Congress any authority to create by legislation any such quo warranto actions that may be used to oust a sitting president or vice president, let alone any authority to delegate that removal power to the judicial branch of government. It is also doubtful that Congress would attempt such a delegation of power given that the Constitution itself provides for a mechanism to remove a president or vice president for misconduct or prevent a person from becoming or continuing as vice president who is not Article II qualified. The Constitution at Article I, Sec. 2 and 3 and Article II, Section 4 gives Congress the power to impeach the president or vice president which only applies to a duly elected and confirmed president or vice president who is convicted of “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” As we can see, impeachment would only apply to a duly elected president or vice president who has committed a serious offense. The Constitution cannot be amended by an act of Congress.  See Article V (provides the procedure for amending the Constitution). 

The quo warranto remedy of removal from the office of president and vice president that Donofrio seeks is beyond the power of the federal courts to grant and would violate the political question doctrine and separation of powers, for Congress has finally spoken on the matter and Biden and Harris have already been sworn into office.   

Finally, Donofrio cites the case of Drake v. Obama, 664 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011) in support of his position.  But that case does not help him.  The central issue there was where a quo warranto action based on the D.C. Code must be filed.  The federal district court had dismissed the quo warranto claim because plaintiffs had filed it in the wrong venue (California).  The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 786.  The Court held that a quo warranto action based on the D.C. Code can only be filed in the District of Columbia.  Id. at 785.  There was no issue before the Court whether the statute applies to a sitting president or vice president.  It did not give any opinion on whether a quo warranto action under the D.C. Code applied to a sitting president or vice president. 

The declaratory judgment action that I propose is the only way that Trump should go

A declaratory judgment action that I propose gives Trump the best fighting chance he has to defend himself in the Senate impeachment trial. A declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. §2201 and F.R.C.P. 57 does not suffer from the procedural and constitutional infirmities of a quo warranto action I have outlined above. Trump has standing to bring the action against the House, Senate, and the whole Congress.[1]   First, Trump will be personally harmed from the impeachment and he presents a real live controversy with respect to that impeachment. He will be able to show that it is Congress’s impeachment that is causing him his harm.  He would also be able to show that the court can give him the remedy he seeks which is a declaration of his rights and obligations respecting whether he spoke the truth about the irregularities of the elections in the contested states and whether his speech regarding those elections legally caused the Capital invasion.  Second, he also has competitive standing against Congress, Biden, and Harris which continues beyond the 2020 election.  See Owen v. Mulligan, 640 F.2d 1130, 1133 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Schiaffo v. Helstoski, 492 F.2d413, 417 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that a rival candidate had standing to challenge an incumbent’s activities seeking to secure an unfair advantage in future elections)). Trump has stated publicly that there is a likelihood that he will run for president again in 2024.  In fact, the Democrats and some Republicans want to impeach Trump so that he can no longer run for president. Given that Trump is no longer in office, personally harming Trump politically in the future is one of the main reasons why Congress, with the tacit support of Biden and Harris, is pursuing its impeachment of Trump.  In his declaratory judgment action, Trump can challenge and seek to enjoin the activities of the House and Senate, designed to impeach and convict him and intended to produce an unfair advantage in favor of his primary and/or general election rivals in the next presidential election. Hence, for these two reasons, Trump would present a justiciable controversy in his declaratory judgment action. 

In his declaratory action, Trump would be seeking a declaration from the court as to his rights and obligations with respect to (1) his statements that the elections in the six or seven contested states were not conducted according to the Constitution and state and federal law and (2) whether his speech on January 6, 2021 is a legal cause of the violent entry into the Capitol. An impeachment trial in the Senate does not afford Trump the same due process rights he would enjoy in a court and satisfy his need to pursue those issues. As we witnessed in Trump’s first impeachment, there is no real legal standard as to what a high crime or misdemeanor is.  The interpretation and application of those words are rife with political bias existing in any given moment of history. For example, then-House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford in 1970 defined the words thus: "The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.  Again, the historical context and political climate is important."  Gerald Ford's Remarks of April 15, 1970 on the Impeachment of Supreme Court Justice William Douglas Archived April 12, 2019, at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved January 17, 2021. Hence, Trump needs to develop and prove as much factual information as he can in a hopefully dispassionate court of law before a jury free of passion, prejudice, and sympathy prior to the Senate trial in order to meet that political challenge there.   

Trump would not have in the Senate the same discovery and subpoena powers that he would have if he first filed the declaratory judgment action in federal district court.  A court of law has more power and will to sanction discovery violators than would a politically charged Senate. The rules of evidence apply in a court but not in the Senate.  Neither a civil nor criminal court would allow as we saw in the House of Representative a witness to offer that President Trump is the “white-supremacist-in-chief,” clearly irrelevant and inflammatory, as evidence of liability or guilt with respect to the Capitol invasion. 

Furthermore, just showing that Trump spoke the truth about the election irregularities is not sufficient.  Trump must also demonstrate that he did not cause the Capitol violence and invasion.  The issue of causation (is Trump’s speech a legal cause of the violent invasion of the Capitol) can better be presented and argued in a court of law, which is highly experienced with the complexity of the causation issue. Consider how the politically charged members of the House of Representatives during the impeachment trial basically ignored the fundamental issue of causation.  Like in the House of Representatives, we cannot expect a similarly politically charged Senate to give to the causation issue the importance that the law demands it deserves. In the Senate, like we saw in the House of Representatives, Trump would probably be subjected to that body’s political judgment however tainted and be made a victim of our current political and social “cancel” culture rather than given the benefit of any legal judgment. Simply stated, Trump cannot expect to receive due process of law in the Senate that he would receive in a court of law.         

Corporate interests have significantly cut President Trump’s ability to communicate with the American people and the world.  They are therefore interfering with his political speech and ability to defend himself and the nation.  With a lawsuit in court, President Trump can fully defend himself by taking action to show that he did not commit any wrong.  There, he would also have the right to have a jury of the people decide the facts based on admissible testimony, exhibits, and stipulations rather than the politically motivated Senate acting as a jury.  Finally, he would also be able to appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and have a path to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary. There is no appeal from an impeachment trial by the Senate. Even if he were to file an appeal to a court of a Senate conviction, that court would most likely rule that it has no jurisdiction because an impeachment presents a political question and is therefore a nonjusticiable issue. See  https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-has-no-role-impeachment .  

In the declaratory judgment action, he would be able to present all his evidence of the illegal elections in the contested states.  He already has much of the information he needs right in the Texas lawsuit, other legal actions, and evidence which he was never given an opportunity to present in court.  With such evidence, he could prove that his claims of election irregularity were legitimate.  Trump would then utilize those factual findings in his later Senate impeachment trial. After developing his evidence and factual record in court, he can then stand fully prepared to challenge his impeachment trial in the Senate and show there that he did not commit any “high Crime[]” or “Misdemeanor[]” and that the impeachment has no factual foundation.  Trump also needs to apply for a temporary injunction of the Senate trial, requesting that the trial be stayed pending completion of his declaratory judgment action. Hence, such an action in the federal district court would provide Trump with greater due process rights which he will not enjoy in the politically biased Senate where political rhetoric and ambition rather than facts will reign.

Depending on what evidence Trump could bring to his declaratory judgment action and what he could prove there regarding the irregularities of the elections in the contested states, that information can be given to Congress. The question then is what Congress could do with the information. The approach that the president “is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” under Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is not practical since the Vice President is needed to start the process and then a majority of a Biden cabinet would have to support the effort. The only other avenue that I see is in Section 1 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which includes the possibility that a president can resign from office. Textually the section does not include a vice president, but I cannot imagine Congress not being allowed to ask a vice president to resign followed by such a resignation. Depending on what Trump would prove in his declaratory judgment action regarding the contested elections, that information can be given to Congress which could in turn request that Biden and Harris resign.

I have demonstrated that Trump should file a declaratory judgment action and not a quo warranto action. The declaratory judgment action will provide him with the due process rights outlined above which are fundamental to our justice system and which he needs to exercise to prove the facts he alleges about the elections in the contested states and that his speech did not legally cause the Capitol illegal entry.  He must bring his case to a court of law first before he brings his defense to the Senate.  Legal action in a court is the only way that he can hopefully receive the due process and justice to which he is entitled. Hopefully, he will do so, for it will provide him with the factual evidence that he needs to defend himself in the Senate impeachment trial.    

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 26, 2021
http://puzo1.blogspot.com

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Copyright © 2021
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved     



[1] Trump and Pence had competitive standing to personally sue Biden, Harris, and the contested states which does not mean making a motion to intervene in an ongoing suit like Trump did in the Texas litigation.  They had to bring their own personal action against those defendants before Biden and Harris were sworn into office on January 20, 2021.  They could have sued them based on the election irregularities in the contested states and on Harris not being an Article II “natural born citizen.” Despite my writing to them and their legal team that they take such action, for some unknown reason they chose not to.  

 


Sunday, January 17, 2021

President Trump Needs to Make His Impeachment Defense First In Court Before Making It In the Senate

 

President Trump Needs to Make His Impeachment Defense First In Court Before Making It In the Senate

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

January 17, 2021

  

1868 Impeachment Trial  of President Andrew Johnson 

ABC News is reporting the following:  

President Donald Trump's personal attorney Rudy Giuliani tells ABC News he's working as part of the president's defense team in his upcoming second impeachment trial -- and that he's prepared to argue that the president's claims of widespread voter fraud did not constitute incitement to violence because the widely-debunked claims are true.

***

"They basically claimed that anytime [Trump] says voter fraud, voter fraud -- or I do, or anybody else -- we're inciting to violence; that those words are fighting words because it's totally untrue," he said. "Well, if you can prove that it's true, or at least true enough so it's a legitimate viewpoint, then they are no longer fighting words."

https://abcnews.go.com/US/giuliani-working-trumps-impeachment-defense-argue-voter-fraud/story?id=75302032

I am glad to see that President Trump’s legal team has focused on the impeachment defense of presenting evidence of the alleged election irregularities to the Senate during the impeachment trial.  As I explain in my previous article, “President Trump Must Immediately File A Declaratory Judgment Action to Vindicate Himself and Put an End to the Election Controversy and New Impeachment,” http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2021/01/president-trump-must-immediately-file.html, if the election in the six or seven contested states can be shown to be invalid, then President Trump did not “lie” to the American people and his speech is protected by the First Amendment. Such a showing would destroy the factual predicate of the Article of Impeachment.   

But Trump bringing his case to the Senate rather than first to a court of law is a grave error.  As I explained in my article, Trump needs the declaratory judgment action against the House of Representatives and Congress as a whole to be able to establish what are the facts regarding the election in the six or seven contested states and what was his role concerning the Capitol invasion of January 6, 2021.  The problem with having in the first instance the trial of those issues in the Senate is that Trump would not have the same due process rights in the Senate that he would have in a court of law.

He needs to exercise those due process rights so that he can later demonstrate in the Senate that he did not commit any “high Crime[]” or “Misdemeanor[].” An impeachment trial in the Senate does not afford Trump the same due process rights he would have in a court of law. As we witnessed in President Trump’s first impeachment, there is no real legal standard as to what a high crime or misdemeanor is.  The interpretation and application of those words is rife with political bias existing in any given moment of history. For example, then-House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford in 1970 defined the words thus: "The only honest answer is that an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history; conviction results from whatever offense or offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office.  Again, the historical context and political climate are important."  Gerald Ford's Remarks of April 15, 1970 on the Impeachment of Supreme Court Justice William Douglas Archived April 12, 2019, at the Wayback Machine. Retrieved January 17, 2021. Hence, Trump needs to develop and prove as much factual information as he can in a hopefully dispassionate court of law before a jury free of passion, prejudice, and sympathy prior to the Senate trial in order to meet that political challenge there.   

Trump would not have in the Senate the same discovery and subpoena powers that he would have if he first filed the declaratory judgment action in federal district court.  A court of law has more power and will to sanction discovery violators than would a politically charged Senate. The rules of evidence apply in a court but not in the Senate.  Neither a civil nor criminal court would allow as we saw in the House of Representative a witness to offer that President Trump is the “white-supremacist-in-chief,” clearly irrelevant and inflammatory, as evidence of liability or guilt with respect to the Capital invasion. 

Furthermore, just showing that he spoke the truth about the election irregularities is not sufficient.  Trump also must demonstrate that he did not cause the Capital violence and invasion.  The issue of causation (is Trump’s speech a legal cause of the violent invasion of the Capitol) can better be presented and argued in a court of law, which is highly experienced with the complexity of the causation issue. Consider how the politically charged members of the House of Representatives during the impeachment trial basically ignored the fundamental issue of causation.  Like in the House of Representatives, we cannot expect a similarly politically charged Senate to give to the causation issue the respect that the law demands it deserves. In the Senate, like we saw in the House of Representatives, Trump would probably be subjected to that body’s political judgment however tainted and a victim of our current political and social “cancel” culture rather than to any legal judgment. Simply stated, Trump cannot expect to receive due process of law in the Senate that he would receive in a court of law.         

Corporate interests have significantly cut President Trump’s ability to communicate with the American people and the world.  They are therefore interfering with his political speech and ability to defend himself and the nation.  With a lawsuit in court, President Trump can fully defend himself by taking action to show that he did not commit any wrong.  There, he would also have the right to have a jury of the people decide the facts based on admissible testimony, exhibits, and stipulations rather than the politically motivated Senate acting as a jury.  Finally, he would also be able to appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals and have a path to the U.S. Supreme Court, if necessary. There is no appeal in an impeachment trial by the Senate. Even if he were to file an appeal to a court of a Senate conviction, that court would most likely rule that it has no jurisdiction because what happened there is a political question and nonjusticiable. See  https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-has-no-role-impeachment .  After developing his evidence and factual record in court, he can then stand fully prepared to challenge his impeachment trial in the Senate.  Trump’s legal team should also seek a court order staying the impeachment trial pending completion of his declaratory judgment action. 

The due process rights outlined above, among others, are fundamental to our justice system.   Hence, all roads lead to President Trump having to bring his case to a court of law first before he brings his case to the Senate.  Legal action in a court is the only way that he can hopefully receive the due process and justice to which he is entitled. 

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 17, 2021
http://puzo1.blogspot.com

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Copyright © 2021
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved
     

Monday, January 11, 2021

President Trump Must Immediately File A Declaratory Judgment Action to Vindicate Himself and Put an End to the Election Controversy and New Impeachment

President Trump Must Immediately File A Declaratory Judgment Action to Vindicate Himself and Put an End to the Election Controversy and New Impeachment

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

January 11, 2021

 

Impeachment of President Andrew Johnson

Attached find the Houses' Resolution advancing articles of impeachment introduced today, January 11, 2021, against President Donald J. Trump. The House will be voting on the resolution on Tuesday of this week. Should the House vote to move forward with the impeachment, President Trump must immediately file a declaratory judgment action in federal district court.   

The document alleges that President Trump committed a “high crime and misdemeanor” when he "incited violence against the Government of the United States." It also alleges that Trump “engaged in insurrection or rebellion against” the United States," an act prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

To support these assertions it alleges that as a lead up to the violence on January 6, 2021, President Trump "repeatedly issued false statements asserting that the Presidential election results were the product of widespread fraud and should not be accepted by the American people or certified by State or Federal officials."  It adds that "he reiterated false claims that 'we won this election, and we won it by a 'landslide.'"  It states that "in context," those misrepresentations along with his saying "if you don't fight like hell you're not going to have a county anymore," incited the crowd to enter the Capitol and interfere with the Joint Session of Congress on January 6, 2021.

The articles also refer to President Trump's January 2, 2021 telephone call to Georgia Secretary of State, Brad Raffensperger, during which it is alleged that he told him that he needed to "'find' enough votes to overturn the Georgia Presidential election results and threatened Secretary Raffensperger if he failed to do so."

Because of these factual allegations and because they serve as the foundation of the impeachment action, President Trump, as an interested party with standing, should immediately file a declaratory judgment action against Congress and the House of Representatives in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. §2201 and F.R.C.P. 57.  There exists a real live (not hypothetical) controversy between the House and him which a court of law needs to decide, for Congress will not resolve the issue given the results and disruption of the Joint Session on January 6.  The declaratory action would terminate the ongoing controversy regarding the integrity of the election.  He needs to ask that the court declare what his rights and obligations are respecting whether he lied to the American people regarding the 2020 election.  He needs the election factual findings and ruling of the court to defend himself in the impeachment proceedings.  In the action, he can challenge the votes in all the six or seven offending states.  He already has much of the information he needs right in the Texas lawsuit, other legal actions, and evidence which he was never given an opportunity to present in court.  Having proven that his claims of election irregularity were legitimate, he would be able to show that the impeachment has no factual foundation and thereby prevail in that regard. 

He should ask for a jury trial and for a speedy hearing.  He needs to ask for full discovery so that he can prove that he did not lie to the American people.  Depending on who wins and losses, the case must be fast-tracked to the U.S. Supreme Court.  All this needs to be done immediately so that the court findings can be used to stop Biden's inauguration on January 20.  Even if that inauguration cannot be stopped, Trump still needs the court's findings to stop the impeachment and for his future political career. 

Having proven in court that his representations regarding the integrity of the election are not false, there is no factual predicate to the articles of impeachment.  It also shows that he was fighting for the Constitution and the rule of law and not to incite violence against the U.S. Government.  Such a factual finding by a court will also show that President Trump is not "a threat to national security, democracy, and the Constitution." It will show that he did not "act[] in a manner grossly incompatible with self-governance and the rule of law."

President Trump should also join a count in the complaint to have the court declare that Senator Kamala Harris, born in California to parents who were temporarily in the United States and not U.S. citizens, at best is a Fourteenth Amendment "citizen" of the United States, but not an Article II “natural born citizen."  He has standing to assert that given that Joe Biden added Harris to his ticket to draw votes away from the Trump/Pence ticket.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
January 11, 2021
http://puzo1.blogspot.com

####

Copyright © 2021
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved

 


Wednesday, December 30, 2020

It Is Sufficient If Only One House of Congress Objects to the Electoral College Vote on January 6, 2021 To Compel The House of Representatives To Vote For The President of The United States

 

It Is Sufficient If Only One House of Congress Objects to the Electoral College Vote on January 6, 2021 To Compel The House of Representatives To Vote For The President of The United States

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

December 29, 2020


The Disputed Hayes-Tilden Election of 1876


This article was inspired by my recent two-part interview (Part I and Part II) with the Post & Email and some of the public comments that followed.  The question is whether both Houses of Congress need to reject a single return of a state’s Electoral College vote for an objection made during the joint session of Congress on January 6, 2021, to prevail.  As explained below, both Houses of Congress do not have to agree to reject that state’s Electoral College votes for those votes to be voided. 

There are five scenarios under Section 15 of the Electoral Count Act of 1887(3 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) (“ECA”) for counting and resolving Electoral College votes disputes in the joint session of Congress.  Scenarios 1 through 4 deal with cases in which both Houses either agree or disagree to the regularity of the votes.  Scenario 1 is the only case in which Congress receives just one Electoral College return and both Houses must agree to reject the vote.  Scenario 5 is the only one of the five scenarios in which the two Houses disagree, but it only applies when Congress receives competing electoral returns (one state submits to Congress more than one Electoral College vote return).  With such disagreement, it provides that the stalemate between the Houses shall be broken by Congress having to accept the electoral votes which a state’s executive (Governor) shall have certified. Hence, under Section 15, one could argue that Scenario 5, which allows for a case in which both Houses disagree, only applies if Congress receives official competing electoral returns and that if it receives only one such return then the two Houses must under Scenario 1 both agree to reject that vote.  As explained below, Congress in joint session is not shackled by Section 15 because Section 15 is unconstitutional and even if constitutional, it does not apply to a case of a corrupt underlying popular vote. 

Again, there are five scenarios for resolution under Section 15 of the ECA.  Scenarios 1 through 4 deal with cases in which both Houses either agree or disagree to the regularity of the votes.  Scenario 5 provides: 

“(5) But if the two Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting of such votes, then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be counted.”

Scenario 1 only deals with cases in which there is only one return of a state’s electoral votes.  It says that the votes must be counted unless both Houses reject the vote. So here we have both Houses agreeing with each other to reject the vote. Implicit is the case in which both Houses agree to accept the vote either with no objection by any Senator or Representative or with voting to accept the electoral votes after an objection. In both cases, the Houses are agreeing with each other.       

Scenario 2 through 5 deal with cases in which there is more than one return of a state’s electoral votes. Scenario 2 is applicable only if there was a “safe harbor” determination by a state’s “judicial or other methods or procedures.” Scenario 3 only applies if there is a dispute as to what state authority is the legal authority to appoint the electors and “the lawful tribunal of such State” decides the matter.  But again, both Houses must agree on that decision. Scenario 4 only applies if there is no “safe harbor” relief as to which of two electoral vote returns are the valid ones.  Again, both Houses must either agree to accept or reject a return. Scenario 5 is the only one of the five scenarios in which the two Houses disagree. With such disagreement, it provides that the stalemate between the Houses shall be broken by Congress having to accept that slate of electors which a state’s executive (Governor) shall have certified.

So, Scenario 1 through 4 of Section 15 of the Electoral Count Act only apply if both Houses of Congress agree, either to accept or reject any state’s electoral votes.  They do not apply if both Houses of Congress disagree with each other.  What applies in that case is Scenario 5.  Scenario 5 is the only one in which the ECA includes the possibility of both Houses disagreeing on how which of the competing electoral returns are to be counted.  But we cannot use Scenario 5 if Congress received only one Electoral College vote return from a state.  Furthermore, the provision purports to resolve the dispute between the Houses through the governor’s certification. Seven contested states, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, New Mexico, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin all sent competing electoral returns to Congress. No governor of any of those states has certified the Republican returns.  Hence, Congress can easily just ignore those competing Republican returns and treat each such state as having provided just one electoral return. 

Notwithstanding this statutory structure, in a case in which Congress only received one state’s official electoral return, both Houses of Congress do not have to agree to reject that state’s Electoral College votes for those votes to be voided. First, it is doubtful that Section 15 of the ECA is constitutional.  Simply, Congress cannot substantively amend the Constitution with a statute.  Congress amended Article II, Section 1 with the Twelfth Amendment because it saw the original Constitution as having not provided for a substantive election problem.  If Congress wanted to substantively change the Twelfth Amendment, again for failure of the Constitution to have provided a solution to a certain problem, it had to do so with another amendment as it did through the Twentieth Amendment. Congress cannot just carve out pieces of the Twelfth Amendment and then change them with a statute such as Section 15 of the ECA. The necessary and proper clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution does not apply here to save Section 15.   

Second, even if Section 15 of the ECA is constitutional, it does not apply to limit Congress’s power in a case of a state’s corrupt popular vote, including a case in which voters in a popular election and electors of the Elector College voted for a candidate who is not an Article II natural born citizen.  It is neither the popular election nor the Electoral College that wields the ultimate power to select the President and Vice President.  Rather, the Constitution ultimately tasks Congress with that authority.  The purpose of the ECA as a whole is to assist Congress in deciding how and which electoral votes of a state to count when in joint session. While Section 15 requires that a state’s Electoral College votes be “regularly given by electors,” it does not address cases in which there is a corrupt underlying popular vote. Section 15 does not apply to limit Congress’s power when faced with a corrupt underlying state’s popular vote. Section 15 therefore does not address cases in which a state’s underlying popular vote was corrupted.

Section 15 does not provide for objections by Senators or Representatives based on corruption of a state’s underlying popular vote. In fact, other than to require that the elector’s vote be “regularly given,” the section makes no mention of the possibility of a state’s popular vote being corrupt.  Hence, both Houses do not have to agree to reject a state’s Electoral College votes.  There can be a case in which for political reasons the two Houses disagree.  If that were to happen, a governor’s certification of any state’s Electoral College votes could not hamper Congress’s constitutional duty to assure that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government” (Constitution, Article IV, Section 4), which means that it must guard our elections from any corruption that would endanger our system of majority rule.  The Constitution is the supreme law of the land which means that the Constitution always prevails over a federal or state statute.  Members of Congress take an oath or affirm to support and defend the Constitution. Congress must have the constitutional power, if not express then implied, when counting Electoral College votes not to count corrupted and therefore unconstitutional popular votes which are the predicate for those Electoral College votes.  Scenario 1 of Section 15 tells us that much in its provision that the two Houses can reject a state’s Electoral College vote that they conclude has not been “regularly given by electors” of that state even if their “appointment has been so certified” by that state’s governor. 

Section 15 of the ECA cannot force a House of Congress to count a vote when it would be a violation of the Constitution to do so.  If Congress cannot agree to accept a state’s Electoral College votes (both Houses disagree) because one House concludes that those votes are based on a corrupt underlying popular vote, then that state shall have failed to follow the command of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 which provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct” its electors. Indeed, if a state can take back the power to appoint electors, then it can lose that power for having conducted an illegal election of those electors. States have rights under our Constitution, but not the right to violate the Constitution.  With such a constitutional violation, no candidate is allotted that state’s Electoral College votes unless, and as to not disenfranchise that state’s voters, a candidate can demonstrate that he or she was the true winner of that state’s popular vote and that therefore that state has satisfied its constitutional duty. If no candidate can show that he or she received the required majority of all the Electoral College votes (270 of 538), then the House of Representatives shall elect the President and the Senate the Vice President as provided for by the Twelfth Amendment.

As to the grounds for rejecting electoral votes due to voting irregularities which disqualify an offending state’s appointment of the electors so certified, there is enough doubt regarding the integrity of the votes for members of Congress to challenge those votes and demand a full debate on the floor. Those grounds are documented, among other places, in the numerous state lawsuits and in the federal lawsuit filed by Texas which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear because of standing. A large percentage of Americans do not think we had a legitimate election. While the immediate seizure of evidence and appointment of a Special Counsel, and a Congressional investigation following the election is necessary, there is enough evidence to now reject the Electoral College votes of the offending battleground states, Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin. See Peter Navarro, “The Immaculate Deception: Six Key Dimensions of Election Irregularities,” accessed here (explains the six dimensions of election irregularities in the six battleground states). As Peter Navarro concludes in his report, if “this is not done before Inauguration Day, we risk putting into power an illegitimate and illegal president lacking the support of a large segment of the American people.”  For further support findings of irregularities in the Pennsylvania election, see Statement by Pennsylvania lawmakers.  

Third, under the Twelfth and Twentieth Amendments, Congress can reject either a presidential or vice-presidential candidate for not being eligible and therefore failing to qualify for the office he or she seeks.  This can occur in the case of such a candidate not being an Article II “natural born citizen.” Congress does not need the ECA to make such a challenge. 

Senator Kamala Harris was born in CA to two non-U.S. citizen parents. She was born with citizenship and allegiance to the U.S. and to her parents’ two countries and not born with unity of natural allegiance to and citizenship of the U.S.  Born with divided loyalties, she is at best a 14th Amendment “citizen” of the United States, but not an Art. II “natural born citizen.” For the full details on what the original meaning of a natural born citizen is and why Senator Harris is not a natural born citizen, see the amicus curiae brief which I authored on behalf of the U.S. Allegiance Institute recently filed in the case of Robert C. Laity v. Kamala Devi Harris, then pending in the D.C. Federal District Court under Case No. 20-cv-2511-EGS, which the court dismissed for lack of standing (not on the merits of the meaning of a natural born citizen). This case is now on appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.   

So, both Houses of Congress do not have to agree to reject a state’s Electoral College vote for those votes to be voided. Both Houses or even just one can object to a state’s Electoral College vote either because the underlying popular vote is corrupt and/or because in the case of Senator Harris she is not a natural born citizen. If both Houses reject that vote or just one House does so, then unless President Trump and Vice President Pence can demonstrate that they garnered at least 270 electoral votes, the House of Representatives should choose who shall be President and the Senate who shall be Vice President. A quorum of two-thirds in each House (two-thirds of all the states for the House of Representatives and two-thirds of all the Senators for the Senate) is needed. Once there is a quorum in both Houses, to carry a vote a majority of all the states (for the House of Representatives) and a majority of all the Senators (for the Senate) is sufficient.

In the end, the Constitution and the circumstances of election corruption it was designed to address should always trump a statute that not only was not designed for that purpose, but actually thwarts that end.  

Here is a list of Republican Senators and Representatives who can be contacted to share with them this article and urge them to make an objection to the Electoral College vote on January 6, 2021. 

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

December 29, 2020

http://puzo1.blogspot.com

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 Copyright © 2020

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.

All Rights Reserved  

Sunday, June 2, 2019

The Fallacies of Congressional Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell’s Definition of a “Natural Born Citizen”

The Fallacies of Congressional Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell’s Definition of a “Natural Born Citizen”

By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
June 2, 2013
Reposted June 2, 2019




Bob Quasius at CafĂ© Con Leche Republicans recently said: 

“The citizenship of Ted Cruz’s father is irrelevant. Ted Cruz was born a citizen of the United States based upon his mother’s citizenship and many years of residency in the U.S., per the federal statutes in effect at the time Ted Cruz was born. A natural born citizen is one who was born a citizen, as compared to someone not born a citizen and naturalized. Ted Cruz was born a citizen, and therefore he’s a natural born citizen.” 


Quasius’ argument is the classic example of Jack Maskell’s formal and informal logical fallacies of what the definition of a “natural born Citizen” is which are contained in his two Congressional Research (CRS) Memos.  Jack Maskell wrote in his CRS memo published in 2009: 

“[T]he weight of scholarly legal and historical opinion appears to support the notion that 'natural born citizen' means one who is entitled under the Constitution or laws of the United States to U.S. citizenship 'at birth' or 'by birth,' including any child born ‘in’ the United States (other than to foreign diplomats serving their country), the children of United States citizens born abroad of one citizen parent who has met U.S. residency requirements."


Then he wrote in his 2011 CRS memo: 

“The weight of legal and historical authority indicates that the term ‘natural born’ citizen would mean a person who is entitled to U.S. citizenship ‘by birth’ or ‘at birth,’ either by being born ‘in’ the United States and under its jurisdiction, even those born to alien parents; by being born abroad to U.S. citizen-parents; or by being born in other situations meeting legal requirements for U.S. citizenship ‘at birth.’”  In this memo, he also added:  “there is no Supreme Court case which has ruled specifically on the presidential eligibility requirements, although several cases have addressed the term ‘natural born’ citizen. And this clause has been the subject of several legal and historical treatises over the years, as well as more recent litigation.”

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42097.pdf  . 

Maskell made his 2009 statement with little force and certitude.  He said that this “scholarly legal and historical opinion” “appears to support the notion” as to what the “natural born Citizen” clause means.  A “notion” is defined, in relevant part, as:  “1.  A general idea  2.  a belief; opinion  3.  an inclination; whim.”  Webster’s  New World Dictionary of the American Language 410 (1983).  Here is another definition:  “1:  Idea, conception 2:  a belief held:  opinion, view  3:  whim, fancy .”  The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 480 (1974).  And this “opinion” only “appears to support” that notion.  Here, we can see that Maskell did not give us a clear and definite statement as to what the definition of a “natural born Citizen” is.  Rather, he only put forth a theory that this “scholarly legal and historical opinion” supported this general idea, belief, or opinion of what the definition of a “natural born citizen” is.   
 
While his 2011 statement contained more force, Maskell still stated that a “natural born citizen” “would mean” any person who is a “citizen by birth” or “citizen at birth,” regardless of the means by which the person obtained that birth status.  Maskell said “would mean.”  That means that the meaning that he gave to a “natural born citizen” is conditioned upon something else also being true.  But he did not tell us what that something else is, let alone demonstrate that whatever it is, is true.  He also stated that “there is no Supreme Court case which has ruled specifically on the presidential eligibility requirements.”  As we shall see below, this is not true, for there are U.S. Supreme Court cases which have addressed the “common-law” definition of a “natural-born citizen” and that is a presidential eligibility requirement. 
  
First, as to the formal logical fallacy, let us break down what Maskell and Quasius actually said into its logical form.  I will use the following symbols:  Natural born Citizen=NBC, and Citizen at birth=CAB

All NBCs are CABs.
All persons like Ted Cruz (born in Canada to a U.S “citizen” mother and non-U.S. “citizen” father) are CABs.
Therefore, all persons like Ted Cruz are NBCs.

First, it is a tautology to argue that a “natural born Citizen” is a born citizen.  Second, this argument commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent (affirming that one is a CAB does not prove that one is a NBC).  Third, this argument suffers from fallacy in that it violates the rule of the undistributed middle (the middle term CABs is not distributed in either the major or minor premise meaning the term has not been defined as belonging or not belonging within the class of NBCs).  So, while the major and minor premises are both true, the conclusion, which equates a CAB to a NBC is false.  We should see intuitively that the conclusion does not follow from the two premises.  An easy way to see the invalidity of the argument is the following: 

All poodles are dogs.
Bubbles is a dog.
Therefore, Bubbles is a poodle. 

We know that this argument is not valid because, with dogs being comprised of more than just poodles, Bubbles can be a German Shepherd or some other type of dog.   

Second, now let us examine the informal fallacy of the Maskell/Quasius statement.  Now we will test the truth of the major and minor premises of the argument.  To do that, we need to help Maskell and Quasius a little by converting their invalid argument into a valid one.  Here we go: 

All CABs are NBCs.
All persons like Ted Cruz are CABs.
All persons like Ted Cruz are NBCs. 

This argument is valid because if the major and minor premises are true, the conclusion must be true.  But while the argument is valid as to its logical form, it is not sound, meaning that the major or minor premise or both are false.  This adjusted Maskell argument is not sound because its major premise is false.  With the major premise being false, so is its conclusion.  Let me explain.  First, the major premise, all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens” is false because the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers of the Constitution did not so define a “citizens at birth” and there does not exist any evidence that they did.  Second, regardless of how a “citizen at birth” may be defined, the text of Article II specifically states “natural born Citizen,” not “Citizen at Birth” or some variant thereof.  Additionally, while it is true that all “natural born Citizens” are “citizens at birth,” it does not follow that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.”  If I am wrong, Bob Quasius can cite for us an authoritative source which provides that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.”  So there is the challenge.  Let Bob Quasius or anyone else who might want to come to his aid provide one authoritative source which demonstrates that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.”  By doing this, he will also be proving that Jack Maskell is correct.   

Anticipating that Bob Quasius will not be able to provide any such source, I have therefore demonstrated how Jack Maskell is incorrect in what he stated to be the definition of a “natural born Citizen.”  Using their exact words, they made an invalid argument about who is included and excluded as a “natural born Citizen.”  Even adjusting what they said to make a valid argument, they made an unsound argument, for they provided a non-existent definition of a “natural born Citizen.”  Either way, Jack Maskell and Bob Quasius lose. 
 
Now as to the correct definition of a “natural born Citizen,” here it is:  A “natural born Citizen” is a child born in a country to parents who were its “citizens” (at birth or after birth) at the time of the child’s birth.  This is the settled definition of the clause under American national common law.  See Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212 Citizens and natives (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758) (“The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens”); The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253, 289 (1814) (C.J. Marshall concurring);  Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99 (1830); Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 245 (1830; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 476-77 (1857) (J. Daniels concurring); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 168-170 (1875); Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F.Cas. 582, 5 Dill. 394, No. 11,719 (C.C.W.D.Ark 1879); United States v. Ward, 42 F.320 (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1890); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 679-80 (1898) (all confirmed Vattel’s Section 212 of The Law of Nations (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758) definition of the “natural-born citizens” who “are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens”).  This is the only definition of the clause that has ever existed in the U.S. and which has been recognized by our U.S. Supreme Court.  The two conditions of being born in the country to “citizen” parents are both necessary and sufficient conditions of being a “natural born Citizen.”  The definition of a “natural born Citizen” therefore excludes anyone who was not born in the country (or its jurisdictional equivalent) or not born to parents (both parents) who were its “citizens” (at birth or after birth) at the time of the child’s birth or both. 

Here is what this definition produces as logical statements:  I will use the following symbols:  Natural born Citizen=NBC; born in the country =BIC; and born to citizen parents=BCPs.
All BIC and BCPs are NBC.
All Xs are BIC and BCPs.
Therefore, all Xs are NBC. 

If NBC, then BIC and BCPs.
X is not BIC and BCP.
Therefore, X is not NBC. 

If and only if BIC and BCP, then NBC.
X is not BIC and BCPs.
Therefore, X is not NBC. 

All NBCs are BIC and BCPs.
No Xs are BIC and BCPs.
Therefore, no Xs are NBC. 

The Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers required that future Presidents and Commanders in Chief of the Military be “natural born Citizens.”  They required this because they wanted to protect these unique and singular and all-powerful civil and military offices from monarchical and foreign influence.  For the sake of the safety of those offices and the national security of the nation, they wanted to make sure that all future Presidents and Commanders be born with sole allegiance, faith, and loyalty to the United States.  Barack Obama (maybe born in Hawaii, but born to a U.S. "citizen" mother and a non-U.S. “citizen” father), Ted Cruz (born in Canada to a U.S. “citizen” mother and a non-U.S. “citizen” father), Marco Rubio (born in Florida to two non-U.S. “citizen” parents), Bobby Jindal (born in Louisiana to two non-U.S. “citizen” parents), and Nikki Haley (born in South Carolina to two non-U.S. “citizen” parents) were not born in the country (BIC) to citizen parents (BCPs).  Because they acquired foreign allegiance from either being born to one or two alien parents (all of them) or from being born in a foreign nation (Cruz and maybe also Obama), none of them were born with sole allegiance, faith, and loyalty to the United States.   Under all of the above logical statements, none of these individuals are “natural born Citizens.” 

The inescapable conclusion is that since Obama, Cruz, Rubio, Jindal, and Haley are neither “natural born Citizens” nor “Citizens of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution,” they are not eligible to be President. 

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
June 2, 2013
Reposted June 2, 2019
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Copyright © 2013
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved