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Sunday, December 18, 2011

Did Putative President, Barack Obama, At the Behest of Malcolm X, His Alleged Biological Father, Live with Then-Indonesian President Sukarno When He Was a Young Boy?

Did Putative President, Barack Obama, At the Behest of Malcolm X, His Alleged Biological Father, Live with Then-Indonesian President Sukarno When He Was a Young Boy?


                                                By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                  December 18, 2011

Martha Trowbridge has published another article on putative President, Barack Obama, whose real name she contends is Bâri′ M. Shabazz. This article is entitled, “Obama History” Mystery Buffs: Sniff Here,” and can be accessed at http://terribletruth.wordpress.com/2011/12/18/obama-history-mystery-buffs-sniff-here/.
Ms. Trowbridge maintains that in 1961, when Bâri′ was just two years old, Malcolm X, Obama’s biological father, decided that it was in the best interest of little Bâri′ that he be sent off to Indonesia to be raised by Indonesian President, Sukarno. She adds that while the decision was painful for her to make, Jo Ann Newman, Bâri′’s biological mother, agreed for the sake of honoring Malcolm X’s wish that becoming part of Sukarno’s family was the best thing for her son, Bâri′.

She cites and quotes “Obama” saying that he moved to Southeast Asia at age two. She contends that in an AP interview entitled, Harvard Student Tackles Racism At Core, published May 3, 1990, “Obama” stated that he moved to Southeast Asia “[a]t age 2.”

Ms. Trowbridge explains why Malcolm X would have picked Sukarno to be a surrogate father to his son. Malcolm X idolized Sukarno, having a deep respect and admiration for the first President of Indonesia, a socialist revolutionary who rid Indonesia of its white Dutch oppressors. He could also offer Bâri′ things that he would not get back home living in East Elmhurst, NY with his mother, Jo Ann Newman. Some of those benefits included gaining a stand-in father, living in a presidential palace, good education, Moslem religious instruction, learning the local language and leadership skills, and living in a nation free from the racism of America. Sending little Bâri′ off to Indonesia also served Malcolm’s need to hide from the world that he, a black Moslem minister who preached hatred for whites, fathered a child with a white woman.

She lays out what Sukarno’s political, social, and economic policies were and concludes that Obama’s are not that much different today. These policies included, among other things, “guided democracy,” nationalization of major industries, and constituting a civilian army for the nation.

Ms. Trowbridge explains how Sukarno started losing power in October 1965 and that Army Major General Suharto eventually replaced him on March 12, 1967, becoming the new president. Bâri′ was 6 years old in 1965.

The question then is what happened to Bâri′? How and when did he make his way back to the United States? Where did he go? Did he really arrive in Hawaii? When did he arrive? With whom did he live? Why has Obama told us that he lived in Indonesia from age 6 to 10 when it looks like it was probably age 2 to 6?  I hope that Ms. Trowbridge will provide answers to these and other questions in her future articles.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
December 18, 2011
Amended December 19, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
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Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved



Sunday, December 11, 2011

Emer de Vattel, Adolf Hitler, America’s Youth, and the Natural Born Citizen Clause

                  Emer de Vattel, Adolf Hitler, America’s Youth, and the Natural Born Citizen Clause


                                                            Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                            December 11, 2011

I read with interest the story published on December 10, 2011 at WND entitled, “4th-graders brainwashed with Occupy 'propaganda'-Student's dad complains to Scholastic News publisher."  The 4th grade child’s father, who I will call “father Edward,” complained to Scholastic because in his view the publisher only provided one side of the “Occupy Wall Street” debate, only putting forth the view that those who are protesting are innocent victims of American society’s oppression but not reporting the conduct of those protesters and who is politically behind those protesters. Read more: 4th-graders brainwashed with Occupy 'propaganda' http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=376177#ixzz1gFmocVmk.  One probably would then say why would I write about that and how does the title to his article really all stay together. Well, let us take a look at how such events are really part of a much bigger picture and why I used the title that I did.

Emer de Vattel, gave us a time-honored definition of a “natural born Citizen” which the Founders and Framers used when drafting the Constitution. That definition is a child “born in the country, of parents who are citizens.” Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 212-231 (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758). Accepting natural law and the law of nations of which Vattel wrote and reported, the Founders and Framers gave the critical task of being President and Commander in Chief only to future “natural born Citizens.” These were to be the children born in the United States to parents who were born or naturalized Citizens of the United States.

This natural law and law of nations definition has been adopted as part of American common law as confirmed by the following decision of our United States Supreme Court and lower courts:

(1) The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 289 (1814): Chief Justice John Marshall, concurring and dissenting for other reasons, cites Vattel and provides his definition of natural born citizens and said: “Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says ‘The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.’”

(2) Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 3 Pet. 99, 7 L.Ed. 617 (1830): The majority cited Vattel on the right of election to change one’s allegiance and thus citizenship in the context of the new nation being formed after revolution. The Court found on principles consistent with Vattel’s jus sanguinis and not on the English common law rule of jus soli, that simply being born in New York, after July 4, 1776 and before September 15, 1776, when the British took possession of New York, was not sufficient to establish one’s status as an American citizen, for a child of minor years is incapacitated from making any citizenship election but rather followed the citizenship held or chosen by the father. On the contrary, relying upon principles of the English common law, Justice Johnson and Justice Story, who wrote separate minority concurring opinions, would have found the child born in New York during the same time period a citizen of the State of New York, regardless of the citizenship of his parents. Id. 136 and 164. This case shows what the majority rule was on citizenship and that it followed the Vattelian doctrine that a child when born took on the national character of his or her father (meaning father and mother under the doctrine of merger of the wife’s citizenship into the husband) and did not acquire his or her citizenship from the territory in which he or she was born.

(3) Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242, 245 (1830): same Vattelian definition without citing Vattel, stated: “If she was not of age, then she might well be deemed under the circumstances of this case to hold the citizenship of her father, for children born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the father, partake of his national character as a citizen of that country.”

(4) Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857): Justice Daniel concurring cites Vattel and The Law of Nations and provides his definition of natural born citizens and takes out of Vattel’s definition the reference to “fathers” and “father” and replaced it with “parents” and “person,” respectively, stated: “The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights.” Again: I say, to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a citizen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. . . .”

(5) Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1875): Even though the Fourteenth Amendment had already been passed, Minor did not rely upon that amendment to define either a “natural born Citizen” or a “citizen.” Rather, it applied the American “common-law” definition of those terms. Providing Vattel’s law of nations definition of a “natural-born citizen,” but without citing Vattel, and not in any way referring to the English common law, it laid down the definition of a “natural-born citizen” as follows:

“The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient, for everything we have now to consider, that all children, born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens.” Id., at 167-68.

(6) Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F.Cas. 582, 5 Dill. 394, No. 11,719 (C.C.W.D.Ark 1879): same Vattelian definition and cites Vattel, said: “[T]he offspring of free persons…follows the condition of the father, and the rule partus sequitur patrem prevails in determining their status. 1 Bouv. Inst., 198, § 502; 31 Barb. 486; 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 147; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. [28 U.S.] 242. This is the universal maxim of the common law with regard to freemen -- as old as the common law, or even as the Roman civil law… No other rules than the ones above enumerated ever did prevail in this or any other civilized country. In the case of Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486, the court says: ‘The universal maxim of the common law being partus sequitur patrem, it is sufficient for the application of this doctrine that the father should be a subject lawfully, and without breach of his allegiance beyond sea, no matter what may be the condition of the mother.’ The law of nations, which becomes, when applicable to an existing condition of affairs in a country, a part of the common law of that country, declares the same rule. Vattel, in his Law of Nations (page 101), says: ‘As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, these children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to their rights. * * * The country of the father is, therefore, that of the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent.’ Again, on page 102, Vattel says: ‘By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers and enter into all their rights.’ This law of nature, as far as it has become a part of the common law, in the absence of any positive enactment on the subject, must be the rule in this case.”

(7) Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356 (1883): In this case, it appeared that Richard L. Ludlam, a citizen of the United States domiciled in New York, went at the age of eighteen to Peru for business purposes, but took no steps toward naturalization in Peru, or toward a permanent change of domicil. He remained in Peru fourteen years and when in Peru married a Peruvian woman, who also was a native of that country. A child was born to him in Peru. This child was held by the Court of Appeals to be a citizen of the United States, domiciled in New York. From the opinion of the court which was delivered by Selden, J., we learn the following:

"It seems to me to result of necessity from these principles, that the children of English parents, though born abroad, are nevertheless regarded by the common law as natural born citizens of England. The decision upon the plea in Calvin's case, which was merely repeating what was decided in Cobbledike's case, as early as the reign of Edw. I, see Calvin's case, p. 9 b., necessarily implies that a child may owe allegiance to the king (i.e., not merely local or temporary, but natural and permanent allegiance), although born out of the king's dominions; and also that this was a broad general rule, not confined to a few exceptional cases, because if this was an exception the plea could not have been held bad on demurrer, as it was in both Cobbledike's and Calvin s cases; but the exception must have been pleaded.

Now, upon what ground can allegiances in such cases be claimed ? If natural allegiance or allegiance by birth, does not depend upon boundaries or place, as Calvin's case asserts, upon what does it depend? There can be but one answer to the question. It is impossible to suggest any other ground for the obligation than that of parentage. It must, I apprehend, be transmitted from the parents to the child, or it could not exist. This being then the nature of permanent allegiance, it follows that the king of England may properly claim allegiance from the children of his subjects, wherever born. If then the child of English parents, though born abroad, is subditus natus a born subject of the king, he must also be a born citizen of the kingdom. Allegiance and citizenship are as we have seen, correlative terms, the one being the consideration of the other. So long therefore as the parents continue to owe allegiance to the crown of England, so long will their children, by the rules of the common law, whether born within or without the kingdom, owe similar allegiance, and be entitled to the corresponding rights of citizenship.

* * * *

I suppose the doctrine that children, if legitimate, follow in regard to their political rights and duties, the condition of their fathers, to be found in natural law, and to be substantially the same in most, if not all, civilized countries. Vattel says: " Society not being able to subsist and perpetuate itself, but by the children of its citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to all their rights." B. 1, ch. 19, § 212. In a subsequent action the same author says: " It is asked whether the children born of citizens in a foreign country are citizens, the laws have decided this question in several countries, and it is necessary to follow their regulations. By the. law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers, and enter into all their rights. The place of birth produces no change in this particular, and cannot of itself furnish any reason for taking from a child what nature has given him. I say of itself, for the civil law, or politics, may order otherwise from particular views. Id., § 215.

It is shown by Vice Chancellor Sandford, in Lynch v. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583, 675, that the law of France, Spain, and Portugal is in accordance with this doctrine, by express enactment it is true, as it is now in England and in this country. But the uniformity goes to show that it is founded upon a law of nature, and of course prevails in every country, unless, as Vattel says, it is changed from the municipal law from particular views.”

(8) Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884): “This section [Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment] contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared to be citizens are 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident meaning of these last words is, not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards, except by being naturalized, either individually, as by proceedings under the naturalization acts; or collectively, as by the force of a treaty by which foreign territory is acquired.”

(9) United States v. Ward, 42 F.320 (C.C.S.D.Cal. 1890) (same Vattelian definition and cites Vattel): “At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.”

(10) U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 708 (1898): It distinguished between an Article II “natural born Citizen” and a Fourteenth Amendment “born . . . citizen of the United States.” It relied on the English common law and Calvin’s Case (1608) to hold that a child born in the United States to domiciled alien parents was a “born . . . citizen of the United States” under the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment. But concerning a 1787 Article II “natural born Citizen,” it cited Minor and quoted its American common law definition of a “natural-born citizen.”

Minor, clearly stating what the firmly established American common law rule (not the British common law rule) was by which the Founders and Framers were guided, had no doubts about who a "natural-born citizen" was, defining one as a child born in the country to citizen parents. Minor said that under that same American common law rule there were doubts as to whether a child born in the United States to alien parents is even a "citizen." Wong Kim Ark resolved those doubts and held that Wong, who was born in the United States to domiciled alien parents, was a Fourteenth Amendment "born . . . citizen of the United States." But in so doing, it did not alter or amend the original and long-standing American common law rule of what a “natural born Citizen” was and therefore did not hold that Wong was an Article II "natural born Citizen." There is no other U.S. Supreme Court case following Wong Kim Ark which changed the Minor original American common law definition of a "natural-born citizen."

We have seen that Vattel informed us what a “natural born Citizen” is and, as our U.S. Supreme Court and some lower courts have confirmed throughout the span of American history, our Founders and Framers, when drafting the presidential eligibility requirements included in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, adopted that definition. But there is another important message in what Vattel wrote which is really the basis for the Founders and Framers choosing Vattel’s definition of a “natural born Citizen.” Vattel also warned us that we cannot preserve our society but through the children of its citizens. Vattel said in Section 212 The Law of Nations that a society cannot fundamentally preserve itself other than through the children of its citizens who he calls the “natives, or natural-born citizens.” Vattel told us that it is the youth of any society that will eventually, upon reaching the age of majority (then it was 21 and today it is 18), assume the power to administer and preserve that society. Vattel was perfectly correct in what he said and Adolf Hitler knew it also.

Hitler, who was not born in Germany and was therefore not a "natural born citizen" of that nation, made his plans for the youth of Germany publicly known when he said: “He alone who owns the youth, gains the future.” -- Adolf Hitler, speech at the Reichsparteitag, 1935. "One of the most important functions of the Hitler Jugend was to prepare the youth for membership in the Party and its formations. Hitler said at the Reichsparteitag, 1935:

'He alone, who owns the youth, gains the Future! Practical consequences of this doctrine: The boy will enter the Jungvolk (boy 10-14) and the Pmpf (members of the Jungvolk) will come to the Hitler Youth, and the boy of the Hitler Youth will join the SA, the SS and the other formations, and the SA man and the SS man will one day join the Labor Service, and from there he will go to the Armed Forces, and the soldiers of the people will return again to the organization of Movement, the Party, the SA, the SS, and never again will our people be so depraved as they were at one time.' (2656-PS; 2401-PS). " 
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/nca/nca-0… Almost the same words were said by Vladmir Lenin, when he said: “Give me just one generation of youth, and I’ll transform the whole world.”

Hitler knew that it was not going to be easy for him to win the hearts of all Germans. “He realized that he would never be able to convert all Germans to National Socialism. He converted many, but many others saw through the official propaganda. The younger generation was a different matter. They came to the Hitler Youth as more of a clean slate which were much more vulnerable to ideological manipulation. He was skeptical about the schools, especially the schools he inherited in 1933. The Hitler Youth was a program that the NAZIs could completely control. Not only did the Hitler Youth provide the vehicle which the future generation of Germans could be shaped, but the youth could be used in many other ways by Hitler and the NAZIs.” http://histclo.com/youth/youth/org/nat/hitler/hitler.htm.

From what Vattel teaches, we can see that allegiances and values are nurtured in the family. And Hitler knew that, too. He also knew that “Youth is easily deceived, because it is quick to hope.”—Aristotle. The First Hitler Youth Law proclaimed: "The future of the German people depends on its youth. Therefore, all of the German youth must be prepared for its future duties." Two subsequent Hitler Youth Laws were designed mostly to prevent families from evading the requirement to enroll their children in the HJ. http://histclo.com/youth/youth/org/nat/hitler/hitler.htm.  In studying the Hitler Youth, we find that “[f]amily attitudes are especially interesting because part of the purpose of the HJ [Hitler Jugend] was to break down family allegiances and cement loyalty to the Party and Führer.” “The boys were encouraged to question or even reject some authority figures, such as parents or church leaders, which appealed to many boys. They were required, however, to accept NAZI principles without question.” http://histclo.com/youth/youth/org/nat/hitler/hitler.htm.

It also does not take much time to fundamentally transform a nation’s youth. NAZI youth organization began in 1922. The NAZIs seized power in 1933. Independent youth groups were absorbed into the Hitler Youth or abolished. The NAZIs by 1935 had enrolled 60 percent of Germany's youth into their youth movement. http://histclo.com/youth/youth/org/nat/hitler/hitler.htm.  The Hitler Youth consisted of two sections, the Deutsche Jugend for the younger (10-14) boys and the Hitler Jugend proper for the older (15-18) boys. “The Hitler Youth grew from a group with a handful of boys to one of the most important uniformed youth group in Europe. No group so thoroughly succeeded in their stated purpose. Had the NAZIs succeeded, the elite of Europe would have been raised and trained through the Hitler Youth. Membership increased from about 1,000 boys in 1923 to nearly 8 million in 1939 when Hitler launched World War II.” http://histclo.com/youth/youth/org/nat/hitler/hitler.htm.

Arthur Axmann, a Hitler Youth Leader, presented Hitler with a newly formed division--the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend--on his birthday in April 1944. The Division was composed of HJ youth born in 1926, making them 17-18 years old. The senior NCOs and officers were mostly SS veterans from the Eastern Front. This Division played a prominent role in the Normandy fighting.

How does any of this relate to America? The message that we should learn is that we should not take so lightly the Occupy Wall Street, text messaging, text+, iPhones, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Droid, etc. movements and networks, especially if someone attempts to use those channels of education and communication to influence and manipulate American youth the way Hitler did German youth. While Scholastic states on its web site that it is committed to publishing all information for the sake of preserving a free society (see the WND article) and it has perceived that there is an important need to “educate” our children about the “Occupy Wall Street” movement, I have not seen one word in its publications about the ongoing national debate about whether President Obama is an Article II “natural born Citizen.” Omission of the “natural born Citizen” issue from its publications, but inclusion therein of the “Occupy Wall Street” movement, should surely raise grave suspicions on the part of any sound thinking concerned American.

What our nation’s youth learns through any medium is, indeed, vital to the survival of our nation as we known it. Therefore, let us be, as father Edward is, forever vigilant about what someone is trying to teach our children, no matter what that subject or the professed motivation for teaching that subject might be.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
December 11, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
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Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved



Tuesday, November 15, 2011

Is Putative President Barack Obama’s Mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, Really Jo Ann Newman?

              Is Putative President Barack Obama’s Mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, Really Jo Ann Newman?


                                                             By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                              November 15, 2011

Martha Trowbridge reports that she has uncovered the true identity of Stanley Ann Dunham, putative President Barack Obama’s mother. She writes in her latest article, Stan The Sham, and True Love, posted at her blog, Terrible Truth, on November 15, 2011, at http://terribletruth.wordpress.com/2011/11/15/stan-the-sham-and-true-love/  that Dunham’s real name is Jo Ann Newman.

Why would Obama tell us that his mother’s name is Stanley Ann Dunham when it is really Jo Ann Newman, a white teenage girl from the Bronx, New York, who according to Ms. Trowbridge was Malcolm X’s teenage lover and devotee?

Is Obama telling us a lie about his mother’s true name because he wants to hide his own real identity?

Is he telling us that lie because he wanted to make himself more electable to the average American?

What would knowing that Obama’s mother’s real name is Jo Ann Newman tell us about Obama’s true identity?

And why would Obama want to hide his true identity?

I have already reported at this blog in numerous posts and comments that various experts have concluded that Obama’s long-form birth certificate which he posted on the internet in April 2011, is a forgery.

I have also reported that Obama is using a questionable social security number issued from Connecticut and that evidence shows that he forged his Selective Service Registration application.

I have already reported at this blog that Ms. Trowbridge maintains that most of the pictures of Obama and his mother that the American public has been fed by Obama and his campaign have been photo shopped so as to conceal the real face of Obama’s mother. These pictures were done, among other reasons, to give Stanley Ann Dunham the appearance of having long hair when in fact she had short hair. Other facial features were also digitally changed in these photographs. So now we discover that not only has this person’s hair and face been altered but also her name. Many of Obama’s other publicly-released photographs also reveal signs of tampering and forgery.

Ms. Trowbridge also contends that Obama’s real name is Bâri′ M. Shabazz, born in New York City, on October 28, 1959, who was assigned social security number 084-54-5926, issued in New York, in 1974. See my article entitled, Is Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bâri′ M. Shabazz, Born October 28, 1959 in New York City? , at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2011/11/is-barack-hussein-obama-ii-really-bari.html.

I also reported at this blog that the Bari Shabazz, who had an auto accident in Honolulu County, Hawaii on March 12, 1982, could be the same Bâri′ M. Shabazz and Barack Obama. See my article entitled, Is Putative President Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bari Shabazz, Fugitive from Justice For 21 Years Following An Auto Accident in Honolulu County, Hawaii on March 12, 1982? , at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2011/11/is-putative-president-barack-hussein.html.

What we now add to our puzzle is Stanley Ann Dunham’s real identity which Ms. Trowbridge says is Jo Ann Newman.

I also reported that Ms. Trowbridge contends that Malcolm X, also known as Malcolm X Shabazz, is the biological father of Barack Obama whose real name is Bâri′ M. Shabazz.

So, who is Jo Ann Newman? Did she and her family and friends know Malcolm X?

The big question now is how we reconcile the name of Jo Ann Newman with the Stanley Ann Dunham life story that we have been provided. As we know, this alleged fabricated life story consists of, among many life events, a birth in Kansas; youthful years and schooling in Washington; schooling in Hawaii; a hasty marriage to and divorce from Barack Obama Sr.; a marriage to and divorce from Lolo Soetoro; a move to Indonesia; and the birth of Maya Soetoro in Indonesia.

The American public has been informed through numerous publicly-released documents and from Obama himself that Obama’s legal father is Barack Obama Sr. Hence, in the case of Kerchner v. Obama, 669 F.Supp.2d 477 (D.N.J. 2009), which I filed on January 20, 2009, before Obama was sworn into office, we maintained that Obama, does not meet the original and still-prevailing American common law definition of a “natural born Citizen’ which is a child born in the country to citizen parents. I cited and quoted, among many other sources, Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758) (“The native, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens;); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 167-68 (1875) (“At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners”). We showed that because Obama was born to the marriage of Barack Obama Sr. and Stanley Ann Dunham, and that Barack Obama Sr. was a British citizen at the time of Obama’s birth in 1961, regardless of where that may be, he is not and cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen” and therefore he is not eligible to be President. We also maintained that Obama has yet to conclusively prove that he was born in Hawaii or any other place in the United States and for that reason also he has not shown himself to be a “natural born Citizen.” We also sued Congress for breaching its constitutional duty under the Twentieth Amendment, despite the many petitions to do so, to properly vet Obama under Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 before confirming him as President.

The New Jersey Federal District Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing, i.e., that they did not show that they were personally injured in any way that is different from how all Americans would be injured living under an illegitimate and usurper President and Commander in Chief of the Military, and so it dismissed the case. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiffs did not show that they suffered any personal injury that was different from that of all other Americans, and even issued an order ordering me to show cause why I should not have to pay for the government’s costs in defending Obama in his eligibility law suit. Kerchner v. Obama, 612 F.3d 204 (3rd. Cir. 2010). The Court quickly discharged it order when I responded that in all the cases filed against Obama and others, Obama not once produced as evidence in court a certified copy of his long-form birth certificate. I argued that I was therefore entitled to see Obama’s long-form birth certificate to prove that the government did not mitigate its defense costs by simply producing the document to a court or Congress and thereby proving or disproving that he was a “natural born Citizen.” Our United States Supreme Court, not giving any reason for its decision, refused to hear the appeal and so the Kerchner case came to an end in the courts of the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court denial of the petition for a writ of certiorari is reported at Kerchner v. Obama, 131 S.Ct. 663 (2010). But as we can see from this court activity, the courts did not rule on the merits of whether Obama is an Article II “natural born Citizen” or whether he was born in Hawaii.

Regardless of whether Obama’s biological father is Malcolm X (a “citizen of the United States”), Obama’s legal father is Barack Obama Sr. and it will stay that way regardless of what Obama might attempt to do to change that. Obama is therefore not a “natural born Citizen” and not eligible to be President.

But let us stay tuned for more to come from Martha Trowbridge.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
November 15, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
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Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Is Putative President Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bari Shabazz, Fugitive from Justice For 21 Years Following An Auto Accident in Honolulu County, Hawaii on March 12, 1982?

Is Putative President Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bari Shabazz, Fugitive from Justice For 21 Years Following An Auto Accident in Honolulu County, Hawaii on March 12, 1982?


                                                        By Mario Apuzzo
                                                       November 7, 2011

On November 2, 2011, I published an article entitled and asking the question, “Is Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bâri′ M. Shabazz, Born October 28, 1959 in New York City? ”, accessed at
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2011/11/is-barack-hussein-obama-ii-really-bari.html. The basis of the question that I asked came from a November 2, 2011 breaking story published by Martha Trowbridge entitled, “Bâri′, Barry, Barack, accessed at http://terribletruth.wordpress.com/2011/11/02/bari%e2%80%b2-barry-barack/. In her article, Ms. Trowbridge’s contends that putative President Barack Hussein Obama II’s real name is Bâri′ M. Shabazz and that his date of birth is October 28, 1959, and his social security number is 084-54-5926. She says he was born in New York City. She adds that he was born with the name Bâri′ M. Shabazz. She also says that to be able to enter the political world, Bâri′ M. Shabazz had to change his birth identity and take on a new one which became Barack Hussein Obama II.

Ms. Trowbridge says: “We know this: Bâri′ M. Shabazz was assigned social security number 084-54-5926, issued in New York, in 1974.”

Ms. Trowbridge has found that the Social Security Death Index shows: “SHABAZZ, B M 28 Oct 1959 Aug 1994 (V) 34 (PE) (none specified) New York 084-54-5926.” From this, one would think that Bâri′ died in August 1994. But no, Ms. Trowbridge informs that only his identity was made “dead.” The real person continued to live and that person became “Barack Hussein Obama II.” Note how she explains that the “death” of Bâri′ was only reported by someone (“V” or “Verified”) and that the person did not present any valid death certificate (“P” or “Proof).

What’s more Ms. Trowbridge explains that “[o]nce in the federal system, the [death] record was flagged as ‘PE’, meaning that an inconsistency exists between what was reported and what was recorded in the government’s files.”

Finally, and the most shocking part of her report is that Ms. Trowbridge contends that Bâri′ M. Shabazz is the biological son of Malcolm X. Hence, if Barack Hussein Obama II is the same person as Bâri′ M. Shabazz, that would make putative President Obama the biological son of Malcolm X.

On November 4, 2011, an anonymous source emailed me something very interesting. To substantiate the content of the email, the writer directed me to go to a web site of the Judiciary for the State of Hawaii and to do a search of cases that have been disposed of by that State’s traffic courts. The anonymous source had done just that and so the person provided me with the information which that traffic court shows on its web site.

I did go to the Hawaii traffic court’s web site which is called eCourt Kokua and I was eventually able to confirm the information that the anonymous source sent me. Access to the court’s web site may be gained by going to http://jimspss1.courts.state.hi.us:8080/eCourt/ECC/ECCDisclaimer.iface;jsessionid=FDFF513AA90109AC4375A7CBE7C8AF36. Once at the site, click “Agree” to the terms and conditions. Then click, “Search for case details by case ID or citation number.” Once there, enter at the prompt, Case ID or Citation Number(*): 1193041MO and hit Search.” The following report appears:







What do these reports say and what questions do they raise? The Case ID is 1193041 MO. The name of the case is State v. Bari Shabazz which was a non-jury case. The case is characterized as a “Traffic Crime,” with a “REPORT number W50100.” The offense occurred on March 12, 1982. The charging police officer is Duane Masayuki Espinueva. The event is characterized as an “Accident Major.” The charge was driving without a valid driver’s license. The case was first filed on Tuesday, March 16, 1982, in the First Circuit, located at Kane’Ohe Division. I checked and this court is located at
45-939 Pookela Street, Kaneohe, HI  96744
. The case was continued to April 5, 1982.

The record also shows that Bari Shabazz was supposed to be arraigned and enter a plea on April 5, 1982, at 8:30 a.m., in Kane’ohe Traffic Court, Courtroom B, at the Kane’ohe Division. The case was continued to May 5, 1982.

On May 5, 1982, at 8:00 a.m., Bari Shabazz was supposed to again be arraigned and enter his plea in the same court room. He apparently did not appear and so the court issued a bench warrant on May 5, 1982, bearing number “BWO 050582.” It appears as though the court set bail at $25.00. The record also shows the entry of “HONDA,” maybe meaning that Bari Shabazz was driving a Honda or that the prosecutor’s name was “HONDA.” The next entry is for May 5, 1982, at 8:30 a.m. The court ordered the “AP” (maybe meaning accused person) to show proof of “NEW YORK DRIVER’S LICENSE.”

The report then shows that the prosecutor on April 9, 2003, filed an ex parte motion to recall the bench warrant and announced on the record “nolle prosequi.” This is a Latin phrase which is formally entered into a court record which means that the prosecutor in a criminal case “will no further prosecute” the case. The motion was listed as “NP [nolle prosequi] 040903.” So, the charge was dismissed upon the prosecutor’s ex parte “Nolle Prosequi” motion made on April 9, 2003. “Ex parte” means that only one side made the application which in this case was the prosecutor.

The final entry was for October 30, 2005, at 8:00 a.m., when the court noted that a $-0- balance was owed, but said “Pls check.”

This information raises the following questions:

1. Is the Bari Shabazz named in this traffic court report the same person Ms. Trowbridge calls “Bâri′ M. Shabazz” in her report and who is listed as “B M Shabazz” in the Social Security Death Index? If it is the same person, then that puts New Yorker Bâri′ M. Shabazz in Honolulu County, Hawaii, on March 12, 1982. Using a date of birth of October 28, 1959, this would have made Bâri′ M. Shabazz 22 years old at the time that he had this major automobile accident in Honolulu County.

2. The accident is characterized as a major accident. Chances are that Bari Shabazz and/or any passenger was taken to a local hospital in Honolulu County due to his/their injuries. If Bari Shabazz suffered any major injuries or laceration, the physical signs of those injuries and/or lacerations could still be present somewhere on his body if he is still alive.

3. Bari Shabazz was charged with driving without a driver’s license. The court ordered him to show proof of his New York driver’s license. Hence, Bari Shabazz must have told the charging police officer or the court that he did have a driver’s license and that it was one issued by the State of New York. Hence, Bari Shabazz must have been a resident of the State of New York. Note that Ms. Trowbridge said that Bâri′ M. Shabazz was born in New York City. Also, what was Bari Shabazz doing driving in Hawaii with what should have been a New York driver’s license? Was he now living in Hawaii? Was he there on vacation? Was he there visiting family or friends? Was he going to school there?

4. On April 9, 2003, the prosecutor filed a motion to recall the bench warrant, to terminate prosecution, and close the case. Why would this case come to the attention of some local prosecutor 21 years following the initial violation of March 12, 1982? A local prosecutor does not just go looking for cases that are 21 years old and file motions to dismiss those cases. Someone must have asked that local prosecutor to dismiss the case so that the arrest warrant was cleared from the court’s and nation’s computer system.

5. Ms. Trowbridge shows that Bâri′ M. Shabazz, according to the Social Security Death Index, died in August 1994. If Bâri′ M. Shabazz is the same person as is listed in this Hawaii auto accident as Bari Shabazz, why would someone care to recall his arrest warrant on April 9, 2003 or almost 9 years after his death? Surely, it could not be Bâri′ M. Shabazz who was interested since he had been dead since 1994. On the other hand, if he was not dead he would be interested.

6. On October 30, 2005, or 23 years following the date of the accident of March 12, 1982, the court again re-visits the case of Bari Shabazz, noting that he did not owe the court any money but to “Pls. check.” Why would the court again concern itself with this case on that date, especially if Bari Shabazz was dead since 1994?

7. So, is the Bari Shabazz named in this Hawaii traffic court report the same person Ms. Trowbridge calls “Bâri′ M. Shabazz” in her report and who is listed as “B M Shabazz” in the Social Security Death Index? That question surely merits an investigation. If he is, then that puts the New-York-born Bâri′ M. Shabazz in Honolulu County, Hawaii, the alleged birth place and once place of residence of putative President, Barack Hussein Obama II. Given what Ms. Trowbridge has concluded in her report, that is a circumstantial piece of evidence that is surely worth investigating. What also supports Ms. Trowbridge’s position that Bâri′ M. Shabazz really did not die in August 1994 and that he is still alive as Barack Hussein Obama II is that the traffic court in Hawaii was still acting on the Bari Shabazz traffic case 9 and 11 years after the alleged death in August 1994 of Bâri′ M. Shabazz. What needs to be investigated is why the local prosecutor and court took those actions so many years after the traffic accident and at whose behest.

8. Finally, when there is an auto accident, the police do a detailed accident report. That report includes the name, addresses, date of birth, and social security number of the person involved in the accident who is charged for that accident. The driver’s license number is also included if that license is produced or otherwise verified. A physical description of the defendant is also included. The make of auto, including the year made and VIN number are also included, along with statements of witnesses. There could be a photograph of the defendant in the police record. A thorough investigation of this matter would surely include searching the police record in Honolulu County for this report so that this information may be examined and evaluated.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
November 7, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
####

Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Is Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bâri′ M. Shabazz, Born October 28, 1959 in New York City?

Is Barack Hussein Obama II Really Bâri′ M. Shabazz, Born October 28, 1959 in New York City?


                                                          By Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                            November 2, 2011

Is Barack Hussein Obama II, a/k/a Barack Obama Jr., really Bâri′ M. Shabazz? See the breaking story, entitled, Bâri′, Barry, Barack, by Martha Trowbridge, at http://terribletruth.wordpress.com/2011/11/02/bari%e2%80%b2-barry-barack/.

In her article, Ms. Trowbridge contends that putative President Obama’s real name is Bâri′ M. Shabazz.

She also tells us that this past Friday, October 28, 2011, was Bâri′’s birthday.

She says that the person who presents himself as Barack Hussein Obama II was born on October 28, 1959, in New York City. She adds that he was born with the name Bâri′ M. Shabazz.

What is also really interesting is that according to Ms. Trowbridge, the names Bâri′, Malik, and Shabazz are “sacred to Malcolm X.” Go to Ms. Trowbridge’s story to see what these names mean.

Ms. Trowbridge says that Bâri′ discovered that he was the son of Malcolm X. He then wanted to complete what his father had started in the political world. But he realized that he could not do it if the world knew that he was the illegitimate son of Malcolm X, a Muslim revolutionary. Hence, he had to change his birth identity and take on a new one.

She also explains that “father” Barack Obama was Malcolm X’s Kenyan friend.

We have heard so much about social security numbers. Here is what Ms. Trowbridge says: “We know this: Bâri′ M. Shabazz was assigned social security number 084-54-5926, issued in New York, in 1974.”

Here is more amazing information: Ms. Trowbridge has found that the Social Security Death Index shows: “SHABAZZ, B M 28 Oct 1959 Aug 1994 (V) 34 (PE) (none specified) New York 084-54-5926.” From this, one would think that Bari died in August 1994. But no, Ms. Trowbridge informs that only his identity was made “dead.” The real person continued to live and that person became “Barack Hussein Obama II.” Note how she explains that the “death” of Bari was only reported by someone (“V” or “Verified”) and that the person did not present any valid death certificate (“P” or “Proof).

What’s more Ms. Trowbridge explains that “[o]nce in the federal system, the [death] record was flagged as ‘PE’, meaning that an inconsistency exists between what was reported and what was recorded in the government’s files.”

Finally, do note Ms. Trowbridge also shows how close Bâri′ and Malcolm X lived together in East Elmhurst, New York.

What Ms. Trowbridge has presented to the world is surely shocking (an understatement). What she says surely needs to be investigated as soon as possible. Hopefully our political, legal, and police institutions will be up to the task. So far, they have not been.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
March 5, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
####

Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved









Tuesday, October 11, 2011

How Obama’s Enablers Mislead the Public on the Meaning of an Article II “Natural Born” Citizen

How Obama’s Enablers Mislead the Public on the Meaning of an Article II “Natural Born” Citizen


                                                By: Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                     October 10, 2011


  You have got to love Obama’s enablers. They have a web site called, “A Place to Get the REALLY Right Answers About Natural Born Citizenship,” accessed at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/a-place-to-get-the-really-right-answers-about-natural-born-citizenship/. Clearly, the title of this web site refers this web site, “Natural Born Citizen - A Place to Ask Questions and Get the Right Answers,” accessed at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/ , which I created in December 2008.

Before I start, I must advise you of two things: first, you will rarely find an Obama enabler who will ever admit that he or she is a lawyer (most of those who admit it have been outed by citizen researchers). The reason for that is that operating under the blanket of anonymity, they get free reign to say whatever they want without any legal or ethical accountability. And they have said some pretty bad things in the past until many of them were outed and so now they are “perfect gentlemen.” Hence, the first thing the owner of this blog tells us is that he or she is not a lawyer. Now it may be true that the owner of that blog is not a lawyer. But what about all the other enablers who feed at that blog under the cover of anonymity? So, we do need to ask ourselves whether these so-called “owners” are just straw owners who take on such tasks to provide cover for Obama’s enabler lawyers who operate in the background under the cloaking device of anonymity.

Second, before I started explaining that there is a difference between an Article II “natural born” Citizen and a Fourteenth Amendment or Statutory “born” Citizen, we hardly saw the clause “natural born” Citizen in the Obama enablers’ arguments. At that time, they were simply content with telling us that Obama was a “Citizen” of the United States or a “native-born citizen,” whether under U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), the Fourteenth Amendment, or any Congressional Act. Now, no matter what case or statute they are speaking about, for these enablers its all “natural born” Citizen. The only citizens they have spared from this label are citizens who are naturalized after birth. I guess they figured that the clause would lose whatever little meaning they have given to it if they pushed it that far.

Let us now examine what Obama’s enablers are peddling on this blog. They must and do attack the Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) decision on two fronts. First, they argue that the definition of a “natural-born citizen” given by the Court is dicta and therefore not binding precedent. But they are wrong. In Minor, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether Virginia Minor, a woman, was a “citizen” in order to determine whether as a “citizen” she enjoyed a constitutional right to vote under the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. So the Court reasoned that once she was shown to be a “citizen,” it did not matter that she was a woman, unless Missouri could still disqualify a woman from voting because being a “citizen” did not guarantee any person the right to vote. It does not matter whether the Court chose to say that Minor was a “natural born Citizen” or just a “citizen.” Either way, Virginia Minor would advance to the next step in the analysis which was whether as a “citizen” she had the right to vote which Missouri could not abrogate. The Court chose the “natural-born citizen” path. It thoroughly analyzed and considered what a “natural-born citizen” was and after saying that it is a child born in the country to citizen parents, found that Virginia Minor was a “natural-born citizen” and therefore also a “citizen.” After the Court told us what a “natural-born citizen” was, it then made the comment about there being doubts as to whether a child born in the country to alien parents was even a “citizen.” The Court said that it was not necessary for it to decide that question and it did not because Virginia Minor was a “natural-born citizen” which necessarily also made her a “citizen.” So the focus of the Court’s decision regarding citizenship was in defining who the “original citizens” and the “natural-born citizens” were. The Court did not and did not have to answer the question about who was a “citizen” under the Fourteenth Amendment which in the question that it raised involved deciding whether a child born in the jurisdiction of the United States but to alien parents was born “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” We know that this latter question concerning who was a “citizen” under these circumstances was answered by U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark in 1898 which also confirmed Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen” and analyzed whether such a child was born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

So as we can see, Minor’s analysis and discussion about citizenship was central to the Court’s answering the question of whether Virginia Minor was a “citizen” which it answered by telling us that she was a “natural-born citizen” which automatically made her a “citizen” also. Hence, Minor’s discussion and decision on what a “natural-born citizen” is was central to the Court’s holding regarding citizenship (as I explained the other holding concerned whether voting was a privilege and immunity originally guaranteed by the constitution’s privileges and immunities clause) and not dicta.

Virginia Minor was not a naturalized citizen. Hence, the Court thoroughly discussed the definition of a “natural-born citizen” which it was compelled to do to decide whether Virginia Minor was a “citizen” and as such entitled to privileges and immunities under the Constitution one of which Mrs. Minor contended was the right to vote. The Court’s definition of a “natural-born citizen” was therefore essential to its holding that voting was not a privilege and immunity originally guaranteed by the Constitution and that Mrs. Minor, a woman, even though she was a “natural-born citizen,” did not have a constitutional right to vote. Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen” is therefore binding precedent which to this day has not been changed.

Second, Obama’s enablers attack the precedential definition of a “natural-born citizen” provided by Minor. To support their position, Obama’s enablers manipulate both the use of the word “born” and the meaning of the word “naturalized.” Regarding the word “born,” their definition of a “natural born” Citizen which is a child born in the United States and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” does not include all the elements which should be included. When it comes to Obama, the element which they leave out is birth to citizen parents. They arrive at their truncated definition of a “natural born Citizen” by arguing that Minor v. Happersett did say that a child born in the United States of citizen parents was a “natural born citizen.” But they insist that there exists an ambiguity in the Court’s definition of a “natural-born citizen” because the Court did not say that a person not born in the United States of citizen parents was necessarily not a “natural born Citizen.” They add that the condition of being born in the United States of citizen parents was a sufficient condition, but not a necessary one. They add that the condition is not a definition even if Minor constitutes a precedent. They then conclude that persons born in the United States of citizen parents are “natural born citizens,” but that neither birth in the United States nor birth to citizen parents is required. They conclude that as long as one is a citizen at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment or any Act of Congress, even if born in the United States to one or two alien parents or born outside the United States to one or two citizen parents, one is a “natural born citizen. The fallacy of this argument lies in denying the well-established definition of a “natural born Citizen” and arguing that it is not a definition and then putting forth their own definition which is broader than the correct definition so that they can meet the broader definition (not requiring birth to citizen parents in the case of Obama).

The question is whether Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen” is ambiguous. The enablers’ argument that it is ambiguous and that it permits for other birth circumstances which do not exist in that definition is meritless. A definition is not ambiguous merely because it does not expressly rule out every possible other factual scenario which someone claims also fits under that definition. De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d at 353 (reviewing 8 U.S.C. § 1254a). The enablers do not tell us that not one U.S. Supreme Court case or Congressional Act in the history of our nation defines a “natural born Citizen” the way they do (i.e., as being any child born a citizen regardless of place of birth or citizenship of the parents) and that on the contrary, these sources (expect for the Naturalization Act of 1790 which is not relevant to Obama, did not support their position, and which was repealed in 1795) have always defined a “natural born Citizen” as being a child born in the United States to U.S. citizen parents. Hence, there is no ambiguity in this time-honored definition. On the contrary, the Minor U.S. Supreme Court has plainly spoken with affirmative language which comprises a definition on who is an Article II “natural born” Citizen. It has clearly set out by definition who is a “natural born” Citizen. Hence, anyone who does not meet that definition is necessarily excluded from that class of citizen.

Another approach that Obama’s enablers take to attacking Minor’s definition of a “natural born” Citizen is to say that we commit the logical fallacy of denying the antecedent. This fallacy is described as:
If A, then X.
Not A.
Therefore, not X.
This reasoning is fallacious, unless A is a necessary condition which in such case, the logic would not be fallacious. In other words, if A is merely sufficient for X to exist, the fact that A does not exists does not necessarily rule out that X can come into existence by some other factors, e.g. B or C. So if A is a bi-conditional which is expressed as “if and only if,” the logical expression presented would not be fallacious. For example, if Joe has a lot of land, then Joe is rich. Joe does not have a lot of land. Therefore, Joe is not rich. This is fallacious logic, for Joe could be rich by having a lot of gold. But if we said if Joe is breathing, then he is alive. Joe is not breathing. Then he is not alive. We do not question the correct logic of this statement. And it is correct because breathing is not only sufficient but also necessary. So what we are really saying is: “If and only if” Joe is breathing, then he is alive.

Obama enablers argue that we deny the antecedent when we say that under Minor, since Obama was not born to two U.S.-citizen parents, he cannot be a “natural born” Citizen. They add that two U.S.-parent citizenship is only a sufficient condition, and not a necessary one. But the logical error that they make in putting forth this argument is in denying that Minor gave us a binding definition of the clause “natural-born citizen” which affirmatively declared what such a citizen is. Hence, being a definition, the elements expressed are necessary conditions and not sufficient ones. Would these same Obama enablers say while reasoning under the Fourteenth Amendment that “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is only a sufficient condition and that it is wrong to conclude that if someone is born in the United States but not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’ that that person could still be a “citizen of the United States” under that amendment? No, they would not make such an argument because they know that the Fourteenth Amendment provides an affirmative and declaratory definition of citizenship each element of which is a necessary condition to earning the right to have that national character. There is no difference with Minor’s affirmative definition of a “natural born” Citizen, but they deny that Minor put forth a definition, but accept that the Fourteenth Amendment does. There simply is no consistency or logic in how these enablers treat Minor in one fashion but then treat the Fourteenth Amendment in another.

Obama’s enablers then move on to Wong Kim Ark and say that it declared Wong a “natural born” Citizen and that since Obama meets the requirements of that case, he too is a “natural born” Citizen. But straightforward reading of the Wong Kim Ark case shows that it did not do any such thing. Here is the question presented as stated by Wong Kim Ark:

“The question presented by the record is whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a ‘citizen of the United States’ by virtue of the first clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution” (emphasis supplied).

And here is the specific holding of the case:

“The evident intention, and the necessary effect, of the submission of this case to the decision of the court upon the facts agreed by the parties were to present for determination the single question stated at the beginning of this opinion, namely, whether a child born in the United States, of parent of Chinese descent, who, at the time of his birth, are subjects of the Emperor of China, but have a permanent domicil and residence in the United States, and are there carrying on business, and are not employed in any diplomatic or official capacity under the Emperor of China, becomes at the time of his birth a ‘citizen of the United States.’ For the reasons above stated, this court is of opinion that the question must be answered in the affirmative” (emphasis supplied). Id. at 705.

We do not see anywhere in the question presented or the holding any reference to “natural born” Citizen. The Court could not have been clearer by telling us twice that it was only deciding whether Wong was a “citizen of the United States.” We clearly see that the case only concerned itself with whether Wong was a “citizen of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment (more on the Fourteenth Amendment below). After all, Wong only needed to be a Fourteenth Amendment “citizen of the United States” to avoid being excluded from the United States under the Chinese Exclusion Acts which prohibited persons of the Chinese race, and especially Chinese laborers, from coming into the United States. He did not need to be an Article II “natural born” Citizen which under our Constitution and Congressional Acts is relevant only to the question of whether one is eligible to be President or Vice-President.

The lack of any reference to “natural born” Citizen in Wong Kim Ark’s question presented and holding is critical given that in the opinion itself, the Court said that “[the child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.” Hence, the Court held that Wong, a person born of aliens in the United States, was a “citizen,” since he was “as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen." Indeed, the Court acknowledged that one type of national character is a “citizen,” who is born in the country to “an alien,” and the other type is a “natural born citizen,” who is born in the country to “a citizen.” Under the then-prevailing notion of merger of the wife’s citizenship into that of the husband, “an alien” and “a citizen” actually meant “aliens” and “citizens,” for no other interpretation would make sense. Without such a reading, the two birth circumstances would always give the same result, for if one is born to “an alien,” parent (just one parent), then one would also be born to “a citizen” parent (the other parent). Hence, what the Court said is that a child born in the United States to an alien can be a “citizen,” but by definition not a “natural born” Citizen because a “natural born” Citizen is born to citizen parents, not to alien parents. The Court knew that Wong could not be a “natural born” Citizen because he did not have citizen parents. So, the Court analyzed, relying upon English common law, whether Wong was a “citizen of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment. By so doing, the Court did what Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875) said was not necessary for it to do, i.e., decide whether being born in the jurisdiction of the United States but to alien parents satisfied the “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Again, the Court said “[t]he child of an alien, if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.” It did not say that that child born to aliens is as much a “natural-born citizen” as the natural-born child of a citizen. It said he or she was as much a “citizen.” Here, we see further proof that the Court distinguished between a “natural born” Citizen and a “citizen,” and that it found Wong to be a “citizen,” and not a “natural born” Citizen. So, the Court’s erroneous use of the old English common law applied only to how the Court defined a “Citizen” of the United States, not to how it defined an Article II “natural born” Citizen, the definition for which it cited and quoted Minor. In short, Wong Kim Ark distinguished between a “natural born” Citizen and a “Citizen” by way of definition and also in its question presented and holding.

It is also important to note that Wong Kim Ark did not revisit Minor’s American “common-law” definition of a “natural-born citizen,” which it said was a child born in the country to citizen parents. Clearly, the Court knew that Wong was not born to citizen parents. Hence, if it was going to declare Wong a “natural born” Citizen, it would have had to address Minor’s precedential definition. Such analysis would have necessarily included the Court examining the text of the “natural born” Citizen clause and commenting on the Founders’ and Framers’ intent for including the clause and all the historical evidence which in any way sheds light on the meaning of the clause. We can readily see from the Court’s decision that it did not engage in any such analysis. Since it was only concerned with determining whether Wong was a “citizen of the United States” under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is a different class of citizen than an Article II “natural born” Citizen, it was not necessary for the Court to re-examine Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen” or to analyze what the original meaning of the clause was. Hence, we do not find in Wong Kim Ark any such discussion on the “natural born” Citizen clause.

Further evidence that Wong Kim Ark did not declare Wong an Article II “natural born” Citizen may be found in the case of Ankeny v. Governor of the State of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind.Ct.App. 2009), transfer denied, 929 N.E.2d 789 (2010) (which I will discuss below). The Indiana court acknowledged that Wong Kim Ark did not declare Wong an Article II “natural born” Citizen. But then it attempts to explain that such shortfall is “irrelevant.” Needless to say, its explanation makes very little sense in the context of trying to determine what an Article II “natural born” Citizen is. Here is what the court said in Footnote 14:

“We note the fact that the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a “natural born Citizen” using the Constitution’s Article II language is immaterial. For all but forty-four people in our nation’s history (the forty-four Presidents), the dichotomy between who is a natural born citizen and who is a naturalized citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant. The issue addressed in Wong Kim Ark was whether Mr. Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States on the basis that he was born in the United States. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705, 18 S. Ct. at 478.”

In its attempt to explain away why Wong Kim Ark did not specifically hold that Wong was a “natural born” Citizen, Ankeny just said that there is no practical difference between a “natural born” Citizen and a naturalized citizen other than that only the former is eligible to be President. But what does that have to do with what Wong Kim Ark held? This explanation is simply not material to the question of what Wong Kim Ark actually held which Ankeny itself concedes--it “did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a ‘natural born Citizen.’” But to Ankeny, Wong Kim Ark’s choice of language is not important notwithstanding that the Founders and Framers when writing the Constitution chose their words carefully and with specific purpose of meaning and Article I and Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 treat a “natural born” Citizen and a “Citizen” of the United States as very distinct and separate classes of citizens when it comes to congressional and presidential office. So Ankeny wants it both ways. It tells us that Wong Kim Ark did not say that Wong was an Article II “natural born” Citizen but then it tells us that based on Wong Kim Ark any person who is born in the United States and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is a “natural born” Citizen. It thus becomes quite clear that Ankeny’s attempt to convert Wong Kim Ark’s holding into one involving a “natural born” Citizen when it really only involved a Fourteenth Amendment “citizen of the United States” must fail.

Desperate as Obama’s enablers are, they then further enlist the assistance of Ankeny in their attempt to show us that Wong Kim Ark declared Wong a “natural born Citizen.” I have already shown that Ankeny itself conceded that Wong Kim Ark “did not actually pronounce the plaintiff an Article II ‘natural born Citizen.’” Apart from what Ankeny said about Wong Kim Ark’s holding, a simple reading of Ankeny shows that, while the court may have been correct in finding that the Governor of Indiana had no legal duty to investigate whether Obama was a “natural born” Citizen, it erred when it went beyond those simple independent state grounds which were sufficient to dispose of the case and reached a constitutional issue when it declared what the definition of an Article II “natural born” Citizen is. It said that Minor left open the question of what a “natural born” Citizen was when in fact it left open the question of whether a child born in the United States to alien parents was a “Citizen” of the United States. Ankeny also said that Wong Kim Ark answered the question left open by Minor and declared Wong to be a “natural born” Citizen. While Wong Kim Ark did answer the question left open by Minor, i.e., whether Wong, who was born in the United States to domiciled alien parents, was a “Citizen” of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not declare Wong to be an Article II “natural born” Citizen. I have shown above how the question presented in Wong Kim Ark was whether Wong was a “citizen of the United States,” not whether he was a “natural born” Citizen, and that its holding was limited to Wong being a “citizen of the United States,” not a “natural born” Citizen. Additionally, Ankeny is only a state law case and surely does not overrule Minor which confirmed the American “common-law” definition of a “natural-born” Citizen” to be a child born in the country to citizen parents.

Again with further assistance from the state-law case of Ankeny, Obama’s enablers then look to the Fourteenth Amendment for help. They add that Ankeny also relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment to show that any person born in the United States and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” regardless of the citizenship of his or her parents, is a “natural born” Citizen. But they do not explain how they go from the amendment’s text referring to a “citizen of the United States” to it saying according to them a “natural born” Citizen. They do not tell us that nowhere in the amendment will we find the words “natural born” Citizen and that nothing in its history or in its debates suggests that its framers included in the amendment “natural born” Citizen status or that they intended by the amendment to create or amend the meaning of an Article II “natural born” Citizen. On the contrary, the amendment was passed during Reconstruction to bestow initial membership in the United States upon freed slaves. This initial membership since the Founding, even confirmed in the grandfather clause of Article II, Section 1, Clause 5, has always been simply called “Citizen” of the United States. Hence, if the amendment were to be used by any other person to gain citizenship in the United States, he or she could only gain that same initial membership which we call “Citizen” of the United States. As proof of this purpose, the amendment only includes the words, “citizens” of the United States. Remember that Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 also speaks of “natural born” Citizens and “Citizens” of the United States. Because the republic was new, the Framers grandfathered the initial members to be eligible to be President. This class included the Founders and Framers themselves who were born British “natural born subjects” and who were naturalized to be “Citizens” of the United States by the power of the Declaration of Independence and by adhering to the American Revolution. But for births after the adoption of the Constitution, it allowed only a “natural born” Citizen to be eligible to be President. This latter class was comprised not of initial members of the United States (only “Citizens” and nothing more), but rather the children of such initial members (children of “Citizens”) or the children of later-generation members (children of “natural born” Citizens). Hence, simply being a born “Citizen” of the United States is not sufficient to be eligible to be President, for in such case, the person’s birth circumstance is missing citizen parents. Any common sense reading of the Fourteenth Amendment would show that its citizenship status is not sufficient for one to be eligible to be President. First, one must be a “natural born” Citizen and not only a “Citizen” of the United States which is the status provided by the amendment. Second, it is not sufficient to simply say that one is born a “Citizen” of the United States under the amendment and therefore a “natural born” Citizen. The Founders and Framers said “natural born,” not just “born.” In order to gain this special status of “natural born” Citizen, one must satisfy the American common law definition of a “natural born” Citizen handed down to us since the Founding and confirmed in both Minor and Wong Kim Ark. One cannot simply obtain the status of a “Citizen” of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressional Act, or treaty, even if that status is gained from the moment of birth, for these positive laws neither by affirmative language nor by definition bestow upon anyone the status of a “natural born” Citizen. Moreover, both Minor and Wong Kim Ark said that the Fourteenth Amendment defines neither a “Citizen” of the United States (it does not define what “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” means) nor a “natural born” Citizen. That would mean by referring to neither a “natural born” Citizen nor to defining one. That is why Minor relied on American “common-law” to define a “natural born” Citizen and Wong Kim Ark relied upon English “common law” to define a “Citizen” of the United States.

So has Obama’s enablers’ position improved any by relying on the Fourteenth Amendment and Ankeny which got it like them plainly wrong? Again, the answer is a resounding “no.”

But Obama’s enablers do not stop there. They also provide lower federal court and state law cases that declared persons born in the United States to alien parents “Citizens” of the United States. First, they avoid mentioning that Minor v. Happersett in 1875 said that there were “some authorities” who said that a child born in the United States to alien parents were “citizens.” Minor rightfully said “there have been doubts” regarding whether these “authorities” were correct, given that Congress since 1790 required any child born to alien parents, regardless of the place of birth, to naturalized in the United States in order to become a “Citizen” of the United States. Second, these cases only defined a “Citizen” and not a “natural born” Citizen.

But Obama’s enablers do not end there either. They then attack Emer de Vattel, saying that nobody knew that “dead Swiss guy” who wrote “some book” on some citizenship “stuff.” Needless to say, the historical record and case law is replete with information which shows how influential Vattel was during the Founding in helping our leaders justify the American Revolution, write the Constitution, and constitute the new republic. See, for example, J.S. Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature Upon International Law in the United States, 3 Am.J. Int’l L. 547 et. seq. passim (1909) (Vattel exerted such a profound political influence that it is often pointed out that his theories served as the backbone for American independence); Lee A. Casey, David B. Rivkin, Jr. and Darin R. Bartram, Unlawful Belligerency and Its Implications Under International Law, http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/PubID.104/pub_detail.asp (concerning U.S. constitutional analysis, “Vattel is highly important. He was probably the international law expert most widely read among the Framers”). In fact, Vattel continued to be practically applied in our nation for well over 100 years after the birth of the republic. F.S. Ruddy, The Acceptance of Vattel, Grotian Society Papers (1972) (Vattel was mainstream political philosophy during the writing of the Constitution. The Law of Nations was significantly the most cited legal source in America jurisprudence between 1789 and 1820). But as we can see, the importance and practicality of Vattel lives on today.

Finally, and this is Obama’s enablers’ favorite ploy, they say for the Birthers to be right, all smart and consequential people in America would have to be part of some grand conspiracy. They paint the “Birthers” with the same brush and paint that they paint those who question the moon landing, the Kennedy assassination, the 9-11 attacks, and whether there is some plot to create a “One World Order.” But there is nothing conspiratorial about correctly defining an Article II “natural born” Citizen and applying that definition to Obama’s admitted birth circumstances. He has admitted and it is corroborated by documentation that he was born to a non-U.S. citizen father. Hence, he cannot be a “natural born” Citizen. There is no conspiracy in that, my friend.

And so it goes on, for this is how Obama’s enablers must make a living.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
October 10, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
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Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved

Thursday, September 29, 2011

New Evidence Regarding Obama's Alleged Father: Is it Malcolm X?

                                           New Evidence Regarding Obama’s Alleged Father: Is It Malcolm X?


                                                                By: Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                                  September 29, 2011



Obama with Stanley
Ann Dunham-Was this
Photo Altered? If so,
Why?

See this new blog called, Terrible Truth.  The owners of the new blog are writers and researchers, Martha Trowbridge and Erik Rush.  They have just written an article entitled, Saps, Stool Pigeons And Stanley Ann’s Hair, accessed at http://terribletruth.wordpress.com/.

The authors maintain, based on evidence of tampering with photographs of Obama’s mother, that "Obama’s Mother And Son photo was falsified to deceive us."

They state: “Truth is, mama Stanley Ann didn’t have long hair when Barack was young. Until, of course, with photoshop-type tampering, The Obama Campaign made sure we’d think that she did.”

One might ask why would Obama care to alter photos of his mother. The authors say this: “Here’s why: Obama was worried you’d find her in places, at key strategic times, with people he couldn’t let you know about. People like Malcolm X. Times like the early and mid-1960′s. Places like New York City.” Based on photo and film footage analysis, they specifically place who they say is Stanley Ann Dunham at the funeral of Malcom X.

They continue: “So it just may be that Barack Obama’s father isn’t Barack Obama “Sr”, after all.” The authors conclude that Stanley Ann Dunham had Obama with Malcolm X, her secret lover. Hence, Obama’s father is Malcolm X.

The authors ask why would Obama have hidden the truth about his origins. The authors say: “Because having a biological father like Malcolm X – a radical black nationalist – would have impeded Obama’s chance for election.”

Please review the photos, film footage, and other materials presented by Ms. Trowbridge and Mr. Rush.

Let us know what you think.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
September 29, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
####

Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved



Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Having the Status of Birthright Citizenship Is Not Sufficient to Make One an Article II “Natural Born” Citizen

Having the Status of Birthright Citizenship Is Not Sufficient to Make One an Article II “Natural Born” 
                                                                      Citizen

                                                           By: Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
                                                             September 20, 2011

Horace Gray, Associate Justice
of the U.S. Supreme Court







I just read an article regarding a debate going on in Liberia about Presidential and Vice-Presidential eligibility requirements. The issue is whether the residency has to be immediately before the election. The article may be read at http://allafrica.com/stories/201109200851.html.

The President or Vice-President eligibility requirements in Liberia are: (1) being a natural born citizen 35 years or more, (2) 10 years residence in Liberia 10 years prior to elections; (3) owner of unencumbered real property worth not less than 25,000; and (4) President and Vice-President must not come from the same county.

Note that the Liberian Constitution even considers those acquiring the status of "citizen" after birth as "natural born citizens."

What struck me as interesting is that they treat their "natural born citizens" like the Founders and Framers treated plain "Citizens" of the United States (distinguished from "natural born" Citizens of the United States). What is also interesting is that Liberia considers a person to be a "natural born citizen" even if that status was not acquired at birth. Indeed, they have created a contradiction and oxymoron right in their own Constitution.

I suspect that Liberia is treating a "natural born citizen" just like the British treated their "natural born subject." For the British, who followed the feudal and monarchial system of subjectship with allegiance to a sovereign King rather than a true republican system with voluntary membership and allegiance to the sovereign nation and its people through free choice made by a child’s parents who then pass that decision to their children, it did not matter if one was truly a "natural born subject" or even a naturalized subject, for they considered all their subjects to be "natural born subjects," which conveniently for the King carried with it allegiance to the King for life.

The Founders and Framers did not adopt the same oppressive system for the constitutional republic. They rejected that a person was born into the allegiance of a King or any nation for life. They also rejected that one could be born with allegiance to more than one nation or later in life maintain multiple allegiance at the same time. Throughout the Constitution, they were careful to distinguish between a "natural born" Citizen of the United States and a "Citizen" of the United States. In their eyes, a “natural born” Citizen was born with sole and absolute allegiance and jurisdiction to the United States and its people. They gave Congress the power to add additional members to the new republic through naturalization, which could be granted to a person only if he or she swore or affirmed to have the same sole and absolute allegiance to the United States which a “natural born” Citizen acquired by nature at birth. So for the Founders and Framers, all the “citizens” of the republic, either by birth or naturalization, had sole and undivided allegiance and jurisdiction to the United States. Through this process, people could make a decision based on free will whether they first and then through them their children wanted to become members of the republic.

The Constitution gave Congress the power to make uniform the naturalization laws. Congress first exercised that power in 1790. The act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103, c. 3, provided for the naturalization of aliens and then provided that "the children of such persons so naturalized, dwelling within the United States, being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization, shall also be considered as citizens of the United States."

The third section of the act of January 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414, 415, c. 20, provided "that the children of persons duly naturalized, dwelling within the United States, and being under the age of twenty-one years, at the time of such naturalization, and the children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States," etc.

The fourth section of the act of April 14, 1802, 2 Stat. 153, 155, c. 28, carried into the Revised Statutes as section 2172, was: "That the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passing of any law on that subject, by the government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said States, under the laws thereof, being under the age of twenty-one years, at the time of their parents being so naturalized or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States."

The provision that children born in the United States to alien parents was carried in all of the following naturalization acts, including that of 1804, 1855, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which required that the child be born in the United States and not be “subject to any foreign power.” Given the world-recognized doctrine of jus sanguinis (also utilized by our own Congress in 1790 to make children born out of the United States to U.S. citizen parents “natural born citizens” and starting with 1795 “citizens of the United States”), the only way such a child could be born not subject to any foreign power was to be born in the United States to U.S. citizen parents or to parents who had long lost any foreign nationality who at that time were American slaves and their descendents.

As we can see, Congress, in all of these acts, did not make any exception for children born in the United States. It simply said that any child of any person who naturalized would fall under the act. This is broad language and included also children that were born in the United States. If Congress meant to exclude children born in the United States from having to naturalize it surely knew how to do so by using simple language. Hence, Congress considered children born on U.S. soil to alien parents to be themselves aliens.

From a reading of the text of these acts, we can see that only non-naturalized persons, i.e., person not acquiring citizenship under these Congressional Acts could be "natural born" Citizens. From this legislative history, we can see that the only persons not needing naturalization, i.e., not needing any positive law to acquire U.S. citizenship, were the children born in the United States to U.S. citizen parents. This is confirmed by, among others, the following historical and judicial sources:

(1) Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Sec. 212 (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758):

"§ 212. Citizens and natives.

The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights. The society is supposed to desire this, in consequence of what it owes to its own preservation; and it is presumed, as matter of course, that each citizen, on entering into society, reserves to his children the right of becoming members of it. The country of the fathers is therefore that of the children; and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent. We shall soon see whether, on their coming to the years of discretion, they may renounce their right, and what they owe to the society in which they were born. I say, that, in order to be of the country, it is necessary that a person be born of a father who is a citizen; for, if he is born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country."

(2) David Ramsay, A Dissertation on the Manners of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen (1789) . He said that after July 4, 1776, birthright citizenship was preserved only for a child born to U.S. citizens. He defined the “natural born citizens” as the children born to citizen parents. Concerning the children born after the declaration of independence, he said that birthright “[c]itizenship is the inheritance of the children of those who have taken part in the late revolution; but this is confined exclusively to the children of those who were themselves citizens….” Id. at 6. He continued that “citizenship by inheritance belongs to none but the children of those Americans, who, having survived the declaration of independence, acquired that adventitious character in their own right, and transmitted it to their offspring….” Id. at 7; Finally, he said that citizenship “as a natural right, belongs to none but those who have been born of citizens since the 4th of July, 1776….” Id. at 6.

(3) The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814). Chief Justice John Marshall, concurring and dissenting for other reasons, cited Vattel and provided his definition of natural born citizens, and said: “Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says ‘The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.’” Id. at 289.

(4) Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). Justice Daniels concurring cited Vattel and The Law of Nations and provided his definition of “natural born citizen” and removed Vattel’s references to “fathers” and “father” and replaced them with “parents” and “person.” He stated: “The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights.” Again: I say, to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a citizen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his birth, and not his country. . . .”

(5) Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875). Even though the Fourteenth Amendment had already been passed, Minor did not rely upon that amendment to define either a “natural born Citizen” or a “citizen.” Rather, it applied the “common-law” definition of those terms. Providing the same Vattelian definition without citing Vattel, and not in any way referring to the English common law, it held:

“The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient, for everything we have now to consider, that all children, born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens.”
Id. at 167-68.

Minor did not cite Vattel but as can be seen the Court’s precedential definitions of a “citizen” and a “natural-born citizen” are taken directly out of Vattel’s The Law of Nations, Section 212. Hence, when Minor said “common-law,” it was not referring to the English common law but rather to American common law which had its basis in citizenship matters in natural law and the law of nations. Minor also distinguished between “natural-born citizens” and “citizens.” When Minor spoke of the “common-law,” it referred to the “citizens” and the “natives or natural-born citizens,” explaining that there never had been any doubts that the children born in the country to “citizens” were the “natives or natural-born citizens.” So Minor concluded that any person who was a “natural-born citizen” was necessarily also a “citizen.” The Court, was not, however, willing to say that a child born in the country to parents who were not U.S. citizens was even a “citizen” under the Fourteenth Amendment, let alone a “natural-born citizen” under Article II. The Court added that “there have been doubts” as to whether that child was even a “citizen.” Having decided that such a child was not a “natural-born citizen,” it left the question of whether such a child was a “citizen” of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment to another day.

It is important to understand that if the English common law prevailed in the United States to define national citizenship, the Court would not have stated that “there have been doubts” whether children born in the country to alien parents were citizens. Under English common law, there was no doubt that such children would have been “natural born subjects,” for under that law the citizenship of the parents was not a factor in determining subjectship when the child was born in the dominion of the King.

So as we can see from this case law, and especially from the precedential definition confirmed by Minor, a “natural born Citizen” was well-defined. All other persons not falling under the well-established American “common-law” definition of a “natural born Citizen,” who wanted to be "citizens" needed a Congressional Act (positive law) to gain membership in the United States which we call naturalization. And these latter persons became so naturalized either at birth or after birth only by Congress.

(6) All this continued unchanged until the U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice Horace Gray--who was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Chester Arthur whom history has recently shown was not a “natural born” Citizen (see the legal research of Attorney Leo Donofrio at http://naturalborncitizen.wordpress.com/2008/12/06/urgent-historical-breakthrough-proof-chester-arthur-concealed-he-was-a-british-subject-at-birth/ )--decided the famous case of U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). The question that Minor did not answer was answered by Wong Kim Ark, in which the United States argued that a child born in the U.S. to alien parents was not a “citizen” of the United States either under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the Fourteenth Amendment which had been adopted in 1868. Ruling against the government, Wong Kim Ark declared a child born in the country to domiciled alien parents to be a “citizen” of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Wong Kim Ark applied the Fourteenth Amendment and colonial-era English common law to determine whether a person born in the United States to domiciled alien parents was a “citizen” of the United States under that Amendment. With the Wong Kim Ark decision, even the judicial branch of government, like Lord Coke did in Calvin’s Case (1608), naturalized a person at birth. By doing so, it went beyond what as we have seen above Congress had always expressed in its naturalization statutes was a born “citizen” of the United States and expanded that "citizen" class. Indeed, Wong Kim Ark did not change the definition of an Article II “natural born Citizen.” Rather, it created another class of born "citizens," those born in the United States to one or two alien parents. Congress had never considered these children to be born “citizens” of the United States. Rather, Congress had always required that these children naturalize, either derivatively when their parents became citizens if done before the child’s age of majority or on their own if done thereafter. These born “citizens” do not meet the definition of a "natural born" Citizen but because of the Wong Kim Ark decision are nevertheless granted a birthright citizenship through naturalization at birth. By naturalizing Wong at birth, the Wong Kim Ark decision, like Congressional Acts which also naturalize children at birth, also created the anomaly that these children are born with allegiance and jurisdiction to the United States and to the nations of their alien parents (through jus sanguinis citizenship), but are not despite our citizenship history required to give an oath of sole allegiance to the United States.

Hence, we now have three birthright citizenships, (1) one under Article II which gives the national status of "natural born Citizen" of the United States, (2) another under the Fourteenth Amendment, Wong Kim Ark, and 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a) which gives the national status of born "citizen" of the United States to person born in the United States to one or two domiciled alien parents and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” and (3) another under Congressional Acts (8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401et seq.) which also gives the status of born “citizen” of the United States to children born out of the United States to one or two U.S. citizen parents. But because the Founders and Framers distinguished in Article II’s grandfather clause between “natural born” Citizens of the United States and “Citizens” of the United States (prior to the adoption of the Constitution, one could be a “Citizen” of the United States and be eligible to be President but for those born after its adoption, one had to be a “natural born” Citizen”), only a person who has Article II "natural born" Citizen status is eligible to be President. This means that only a person who was born in the United States to two U.S. citizen parents is eligible to be President.

This all brings us to putative President, Barack Obama. If Obama was born in Hawaii (a fact that he has yet to conclusively prove) and if his parents are Barack Obama and Stanley Ann Dunham (it is reported that these are his parents), he can be a Fourteenth Amendment and 8 U.S.C. Section 1401(a) born “citizen” of the United States, but he cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen” of the United States which is the constitutional standard that he must meet to be eligible to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military. His mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, was a “citizen” of the United States at the time of Obama’s birth. But his father, being born in 1934 or 1936 in what was then the British colony of Kenya, was under the British Nationality Act of 1948, a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (“CUKC”). Obama himself by right of decent from his father under the same Act was also born a CUKC. Hence, because Obama was not born in the United States to United States citizen parents, he was not born under the sole and undivided allegiance and jurisdiction of the United States. Obama was not born with sole citizenship in the United States. Consequently, he was not born with unity of allegiance to and citizenship in the United States. Obama, therefore, cannot be an Article II “natural born Citizen” and is not eligible under Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 to be President and Commander in Chief of the Military, just as much as if he had not been at least 35 years of age or 14 years a resident of the United States.

Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
September 20, 2011
http://puzo1.blogspot.com/
####

Copyright © 2011
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved