The
Constitution, the Rule of Law, and the “Natural Born Citizen” Clause: A Response to Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl
Reporter
By Mario Apuzzo,
Esq.
July 19, 2013
Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl Reporter
(“Squeeky Fromm”) continues in vain to try to persuade the public that she has refuted
my position that an Article II “natural born Citizen” is a child born in the
country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time of the child’s
birth.
I.
Squeeky Fromm has
taken a stab at my Jack Maskell article, The
Fallacies of Congressional Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell’s Definition of a
“Natural Born Citizen,” accessed at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-fallacies-of-congressional.html . You can read her response here. http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/08/he-says-apuzzo-i-say-a-pazzo/
She says that I have misread Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), because the Court said that “new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” I say, so what in light of the fact that the Court also said: “At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Id. at 167-68. Hence, the Court said that at common law, if one was not born in the country to citizen parents, one was an “alien or foreigner.” This is the same exact treatment that Congress gave to children born in the United States to alien parents in its Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, 1802, and 1855. In these acts, Congress treated children born in the United States to alien parents as alien born and in need of naturalization. So Squeeky Fromm has proven nothing other than to show that she does not understand what she reads.
Then Squeeky Fromm turns to my logical analysis of the Maskell fallacious argument. In the first part of her attempt at logic, it is quite clear that she has totally missed my point about Maskell’s first argument being invalid. I showed that Maskell’s first argument as having this invalid logical form (“natural born Citizen”=NBC; “citizen at birth”=CAB):
All NBCs are CABs.
All X’s are CABs.
Therefore, all X’s are NBC.
To show the invalidity of this argument, I wrote:
All poodles are dogs.
Bubbles is a dog.
Therefore, Bubbles is a poodle.
Squeeky Fromm says that this argument is not valid and faults me for presenting it. She misstates my presentation, even attempting to prove me wrong by showing through some other irrelevant logical argument why this argument is not valid. I said that this is the argument presented by Maskell. But I said that this is Maskell’s argument and that it is not valid because it violates the rule of the undistributed middle and is also fallacious for affirming the consequent. So, what is ironic is that Squeeky Fromm attacks me, in her twisted and incorrect way, for the argument when what she is really doing is attacking Jack Maskell.
Then Squeeky Fromm takes a shot at the second part of my analysis of the Maskell argument. I recast his argument as follows to make the argument valid:
All CAB’s are NBCs.
All X’s are CAB’s.
Therefore, all X’s are NBCs.
In my article, I explained that I took Maskell’s invalid argument (above) and made it valid through this logical form. I did this to show where Maskell’s informal fallacy is hidden. I showed how this argument is logically valid, but unsound because its major premise, All CAB’s are NBCs, is false. I explained that Maskell has not presented any evidence to prove the truth of this major premise. I presented U.S. Supreme Court case law which addressed the meaning of a “natural-born citizen” and this case law does not support Maskell’s thesis that all “citizens at birth” are “natural-born citizens.” See below for a summary of these cases. And even though Squeeky Fromm comes to Maskell’s aid, she also does not present any evidence to show that Maskell’s major premise, as reconstructed by me, would be true. What she does in place of presenting any evidence that the major premise is true is just to say that the premise does not strike her “as being facially incorrect, invalid, or untrue.” From this statement we can see that Squeeky Fromm has very little understanding of informal logic and fallacies. An informal fallacy has the exact facial appeal that she relies upon. But when its underlying truth is tested, it fails.
I have demonstrated how Maskell has not proven that his major premise is true. I have also presented evidence that shows that his major premise is false. I have therefore unmasked the informal fallacy of the Maskell major premise, i.e., that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.” Yet, Squeeky Fromm says that I have proven nothing. On the contrary, she is the one who just says a lot of mixed up nothing, demonstrates how incapable she is of understanding case law, and proves how ignorant she is when it comes to logic.
She says that I have misread Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875), because the Court said that “new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” I say, so what in light of the fact that the Court also said: “At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners.” Id. at 167-68. Hence, the Court said that at common law, if one was not born in the country to citizen parents, one was an “alien or foreigner.” This is the same exact treatment that Congress gave to children born in the United States to alien parents in its Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, 1802, and 1855. In these acts, Congress treated children born in the United States to alien parents as alien born and in need of naturalization. So Squeeky Fromm has proven nothing other than to show that she does not understand what she reads.
Then Squeeky Fromm turns to my logical analysis of the Maskell fallacious argument. In the first part of her attempt at logic, it is quite clear that she has totally missed my point about Maskell’s first argument being invalid. I showed that Maskell’s first argument as having this invalid logical form (“natural born Citizen”=NBC; “citizen at birth”=CAB):
All NBCs are CABs.
All X’s are CABs.
Therefore, all X’s are NBC.
To show the invalidity of this argument, I wrote:
All poodles are dogs.
Bubbles is a dog.
Therefore, Bubbles is a poodle.
Squeeky Fromm says that this argument is not valid and faults me for presenting it. She misstates my presentation, even attempting to prove me wrong by showing through some other irrelevant logical argument why this argument is not valid. I said that this is the argument presented by Maskell. But I said that this is Maskell’s argument and that it is not valid because it violates the rule of the undistributed middle and is also fallacious for affirming the consequent. So, what is ironic is that Squeeky Fromm attacks me, in her twisted and incorrect way, for the argument when what she is really doing is attacking Jack Maskell.
Then Squeeky Fromm takes a shot at the second part of my analysis of the Maskell argument. I recast his argument as follows to make the argument valid:
All CAB’s are NBCs.
All X’s are CAB’s.
Therefore, all X’s are NBCs.
In my article, I explained that I took Maskell’s invalid argument (above) and made it valid through this logical form. I did this to show where Maskell’s informal fallacy is hidden. I showed how this argument is logically valid, but unsound because its major premise, All CAB’s are NBCs, is false. I explained that Maskell has not presented any evidence to prove the truth of this major premise. I presented U.S. Supreme Court case law which addressed the meaning of a “natural-born citizen” and this case law does not support Maskell’s thesis that all “citizens at birth” are “natural-born citizens.” See below for a summary of these cases. And even though Squeeky Fromm comes to Maskell’s aid, she also does not present any evidence to show that Maskell’s major premise, as reconstructed by me, would be true. What she does in place of presenting any evidence that the major premise is true is just to say that the premise does not strike her “as being facially incorrect, invalid, or untrue.” From this statement we can see that Squeeky Fromm has very little understanding of informal logic and fallacies. An informal fallacy has the exact facial appeal that she relies upon. But when its underlying truth is tested, it fails.
I have demonstrated how Maskell has not proven that his major premise is true. I have also presented evidence that shows that his major premise is false. I have therefore unmasked the informal fallacy of the Maskell major premise, i.e., that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.” Yet, Squeeky Fromm says that I have proven nothing. On the contrary, she is the one who just says a lot of mixed up nothing, demonstrates how incapable she is of understanding case law, and proves how ignorant she is when it comes to logic.
II.
In her June 12, 2013 “Distributed
Muddle” article, accessed at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/12/mario-apuzzo-esq-s-distributed-muddle/
,
Squeeky Fromm tries to persuade that she successfully addressed my criticisms of Congressional Attorney Jack Maskell’s thesis (his major premise) that all born citizens are “natural born citizens.” From her article we can see that she is starting to understand the world of logic a little better. But she does not admit the blunder that she made with the first part of my logical presentation in which I expose why to argue, that since all “natural born Citizen” are “citizens at birth,” and since Barack Obama is a “citizen at birth,” he is a “natural born Citizen,” is logically invalid. We have to recognize this argument and show that it is invalid because it is one of the means by which Maskell arrives at his conclusion that Obama is a “natural born citizen.”
Second, Squeeky Fromm, underplays the second part of my logical analysis where I show, by converting Maskell’s invalid argument into a valid argument, that Maskell’s second argument is unsound because the major premises is false. Maskell’s second argument can only be all “citizens at birth” are “natural born citizens,” and since Obama is a “citizen at birth,” he is a “natural born citizen.” Maskell’s major premise in this argument would be all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.” Squeeky Fromm fails to understand the importance of the maneuver of taking someone’s invalid argument and making valid. It is done to show that if the argument is to succeed, then its premises must be true. And it is here that I have shown that Maskell’s major premise is false and therefore also his conclusion that Obama is a “natural born citizen.”
Squeeky Fromm just blows this point off by simply saying that there is just a disagreement between Maskell and me on the definition of a “natural born Citizen.” Now is that not just genius for Squeeky Fromm to figure out. I have challenged both Maskell and Squeeky Fromm to provide evidence that Maskell’s major premise is true. We do not hear from Maskell nor do we expect to. And from Squeeky Fromm, who loves to make herself heard on a daily basis, she simply says that United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) trumps Minor. So there you have the strength of their argument which is supposed to prove that Maskell’s major premise is true. We know that Minor defined a “natural-born citizen” as a child born in the country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth. And we also know that Wong Kim Ark, interpreting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its “subject to the jurisdiction” clause, and ultimately defining a “citizen of the United States” at birth under that amendment, did not alter Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen,” and even distinguished a “natural-born citizen” from a “citizen of the United States” at birth under that amendment. Squeeky Fromm is just making stuff up given that she has nothing else to present to us which would show that the Maskell major premises is true.
So, Maskell’s first argument, that since Obama is a “citizen at birth” he is a “natural born Citizen” is not valid. And his second argument which necessarily contains the major premise, all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens,” has no historical and legal support. Hence, Maskell’s argument, no matter which one we choose as to what is a “natural born Citizen” and whether Obama meets that definition, is false.
Squeeky Fromm tries to persuade that she successfully addressed my criticisms of Congressional Attorney Jack Maskell’s thesis (his major premise) that all born citizens are “natural born citizens.” From her article we can see that she is starting to understand the world of logic a little better. But she does not admit the blunder that she made with the first part of my logical presentation in which I expose why to argue, that since all “natural born Citizen” are “citizens at birth,” and since Barack Obama is a “citizen at birth,” he is a “natural born Citizen,” is logically invalid. We have to recognize this argument and show that it is invalid because it is one of the means by which Maskell arrives at his conclusion that Obama is a “natural born citizen.”
Second, Squeeky Fromm, underplays the second part of my logical analysis where I show, by converting Maskell’s invalid argument into a valid argument, that Maskell’s second argument is unsound because the major premises is false. Maskell’s second argument can only be all “citizens at birth” are “natural born citizens,” and since Obama is a “citizen at birth,” he is a “natural born citizen.” Maskell’s major premise in this argument would be all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens.” Squeeky Fromm fails to understand the importance of the maneuver of taking someone’s invalid argument and making valid. It is done to show that if the argument is to succeed, then its premises must be true. And it is here that I have shown that Maskell’s major premise is false and therefore also his conclusion that Obama is a “natural born citizen.”
Squeeky Fromm just blows this point off by simply saying that there is just a disagreement between Maskell and me on the definition of a “natural born Citizen.” Now is that not just genius for Squeeky Fromm to figure out. I have challenged both Maskell and Squeeky Fromm to provide evidence that Maskell’s major premise is true. We do not hear from Maskell nor do we expect to. And from Squeeky Fromm, who loves to make herself heard on a daily basis, she simply says that United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) trumps Minor. So there you have the strength of their argument which is supposed to prove that Maskell’s major premise is true. We know that Minor defined a “natural-born citizen” as a child born in the country to parents who were its citizens at the time of the child’s birth. And we also know that Wong Kim Ark, interpreting the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and its “subject to the jurisdiction” clause, and ultimately defining a “citizen of the United States” at birth under that amendment, did not alter Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen,” and even distinguished a “natural-born citizen” from a “citizen of the United States” at birth under that amendment. Squeeky Fromm is just making stuff up given that she has nothing else to present to us which would show that the Maskell major premises is true.
So, Maskell’s first argument, that since Obama is a “citizen at birth” he is a “natural born Citizen” is not valid. And his second argument which necessarily contains the major premise, all “citizens at birth” are “natural born Citizens,” has no historical and legal support. Hence, Maskell’s argument, no matter which one we choose as to what is a “natural born Citizen” and whether Obama meets that definition, is false.
III.
Squeeky Fromm also comes to the aid of
Ted Cruz in her June 25, 2013 article published at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/25/with-2020-foresight-the-once-and-future-apuzzo/ . In this piece, which she passes
off as a decision against me rendered by an imaginary judge, she argues, albeit
without any historical or legal support, that my definition of a “natural born
citizen,” i.e., a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens”
at the time of the child’s birth is wrong.
She maintains that Cruz, who was born in Canada to a non-U.S. “citizen”
father and a U.S. “citizen” mother is a “natural born citizen.”
She attempts to
dismiss Minor as being irrelevant to the issue of both Obama and Cruz’s
eligibility, arguing that Minor did not define or deal with children
born inside the United States to alien parents. This is incorrect. Minor told
us that at common law with which the Framers were familiar, such children were
“aliens or foreigners.” Here is the quote from the Court: “At
common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were
familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its
citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These
were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or
foreigners.” We can see from what the
Court said that at common law if a child was born in the United States to alien
parents, the child was an “alien or foreigner.”
It also follows from this common law rule that at common law (not to be
confounded with statutes), any child who was born out of the United States,
regardless of whether born to “citizen” parents or alien parents, was also an
alien or foreigner. This common law rule was reflected in Congress’s
Naturalization Acts of 1790, 1795, 1802, and 1855 which treated children born
in the United States to alien parents as alien born and naturalized at
birth children born out of the United States to “citizen” parents or
naturalized them after birth if born to alien parents.
She states that the clause “natural born citizen” “was discussed at length in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.” This is false. Wong Kim Ark discussed at length the English common law and an English “natural born subject.” The English common law defined neither a “citizen” nor a “natural born citizen.” Justice Swayne in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (Cir.Ct. D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151), told us that neither a “citizen” nor a “natural born citizen” were defined by the English common law. The court said that “British jurisprudence, whence so much of our own is drawn, throws little light upon the subject. . . . Blackstone and Tomlin contain nothing upon the subject. ” Id. at 788. So, Wong Kim Ark, which spent much time on analyzing the English common law, could not have been analyzing the meaning of a “natural born citizen” which clause was not even found in that law.
She states that the clause “natural born citizen” “was discussed at length in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark.” This is false. Wong Kim Ark discussed at length the English common law and an English “natural born subject.” The English common law defined neither a “citizen” nor a “natural born citizen.” Justice Swayne in United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (Cir.Ct. D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151), told us that neither a “citizen” nor a “natural born citizen” were defined by the English common law. The court said that “British jurisprudence, whence so much of our own is drawn, throws little light upon the subject. . . . Blackstone and Tomlin contain nothing upon the subject. ” Id. at 788. So, Wong Kim Ark, which spent much time on analyzing the English common law, could not have been analyzing the meaning of a “natural born citizen” which clause was not even found in that law.
Squeeky Fromm quotes
Wong Kim Ark’s comment that the English common law jus soli rule continued “to
prevail under the Constitution as originally established.” This statement does
not prove that a “natural born citizen” was defined under English common law
and not under the law of nations. What this statement means is that through the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, the states, which selectively adopted
the English common law until abrogated by state legislatures, decided who their
citizens were and that they to some undefined degree used the jus soli English
common law rule to make that decision. These state citizens became “citizens of
the United States” upon the adoption of the Constitution. But then in 1790,
Congress passed the Naturalization Act of 1790, followed by that of 1795, 1802,
and 1855. After that, the states, to whatever degree they still applied the
English common law, could no longer naturalize anyone after birth and their
state citizens were no longer recognized as national citizens or what the
Constitution called “citizens of the United States.” The only common law rule
that Congress did not nor could abrogate was that of the law of
nations/American national common law which the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers
used to certainly and uniformly define a “natural born citizen.” And that
definition was a child born in a country to parents who were its “citizens” at
the time of the child’s birth.
Squeeky Fromm repeats that “citizens at birth” are equivalent to “natural born citizens.” But like Jack Maskell, she begs the question that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born citizens.” Other than just assuming, like Jack Maskell, that her statement is true, she fails to provide any evidence that her statement is true. Hence, that the Fourteenth Amendment or a Congressional Act might declare someone born either in the United States or out of it to be a “citizen at birth” does not prove that that person is a “natural born citizen.”
She argues that Ted Cruz is a “natural born citizen” under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(g). Here, she makes the absurd argument that Cruz is a “natural born citizen” by way of a naturalization act of Congress. Using her logic, the “natural born citizen” clause would have no meaning or limits if Congress could simply naturalize anyone at birth which Squeeky Fromm then considers to be a “natural born citizen.” She looks to the Naturalization Act of 1790 for support. Regarding whether children born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents are “natural-born citizens,” the Naturalization Act of 1790 does not help Squeeky Fromm because the 1795 Act, with the work of James Madison, repealed it and replaced “natural born citizen” with “citizen of the United States.” Despite her statement that Congress never did so, the 1795 Act, with James Madison’s influence, plainly shows from its text that “Congress intended to limit the rights of foreign born citizens at birth to some quanta less than that of a natural born citizen.” Furthermore, Wong Kim Ark informed us that the Fourteenth Amendment “has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents, and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.” So, Wong Kim Ark told us that children born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents become “citizens at birth” under Congress’s naturalization powers. That means they are naturalized at birth. By her own concession, if they are naturalized, they cannot be “natural born citizens,” regardless of when they obtain their citizenship.
Squeeky Fromm repeats that “citizens at birth” are equivalent to “natural born citizens.” But like Jack Maskell, she begs the question that all “citizens at birth” are “natural born citizens.” Other than just assuming, like Jack Maskell, that her statement is true, she fails to provide any evidence that her statement is true. Hence, that the Fourteenth Amendment or a Congressional Act might declare someone born either in the United States or out of it to be a “citizen at birth” does not prove that that person is a “natural born citizen.”
She argues that Ted Cruz is a “natural born citizen” under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(g). Here, she makes the absurd argument that Cruz is a “natural born citizen” by way of a naturalization act of Congress. Using her logic, the “natural born citizen” clause would have no meaning or limits if Congress could simply naturalize anyone at birth which Squeeky Fromm then considers to be a “natural born citizen.” She looks to the Naturalization Act of 1790 for support. Regarding whether children born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents are “natural-born citizens,” the Naturalization Act of 1790 does not help Squeeky Fromm because the 1795 Act, with the work of James Madison, repealed it and replaced “natural born citizen” with “citizen of the United States.” Despite her statement that Congress never did so, the 1795 Act, with James Madison’s influence, plainly shows from its text that “Congress intended to limit the rights of foreign born citizens at birth to some quanta less than that of a natural born citizen.” Furthermore, Wong Kim Ark informed us that the Fourteenth Amendment “has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents, and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.” So, Wong Kim Ark told us that children born out of the United States to U.S. “citizen” parents become “citizens at birth” under Congress’s naturalization powers. That means they are naturalized at birth. By her own concession, if they are naturalized, they cannot be “natural born citizens,” regardless of when they obtain their citizenship.
Squeeky Fromm puts
forth a straw man argument, arguing that it is an injustice that the children
born abroad to our military should be denied the status of “natural born
citizens.” But she misstates my position
on that issue. I have always argued,
under Vattel’s Section 217, a child born out of the United States to U.S.
“citizen” parents serving the defense of the United States (“the armies of the
state”) is reputed born in the United States and therefore a “natural born
citizen.” This rule makes John McCain, who was born to U.S. “citizen” parents
serving the U.S. national defense, a “natural born citizen” regardless of where
in Panama he may have been born.
Squeeky Fromm argues that my position that if Congress makes one a “citizen” at birth, then Congress naturalized that person to be a “citizen” at birth is absurd because Congress in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a) passed a statute which also acts upon the “natural born citizens.” But that Congress may choose to pass a statute acting upon “natural born citizens” does not make those persons naturalized citizens. Those persons are “natural born citizen” and they do not lose that status because Congress may pass a naturalization statute which also acts upon them.
Squeeky Fromm engages in an invalid logical argument, arguing: All "natural born citizens" are "citizens at birth," and since Ted Cruz is a "citizen at birth," he is a "natural born Citizen." As I have shown above, this argument violates the rule of the undistributed middle. It is also fallacious for affirming the consequent. As I have already explained, Jack Maskell commits the same logical errors. She also commits logical error when she argues: All “natural born citizens are not naturalized citizens. Since Ted Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, he is a “natural born citizen.” She does not understand that we cannot arrive at an affirmative conclusion by way of one or two negative premises.
Squeeky Fromm argues that “natural born citizens” are not naturalized citizens. Citizens “may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” She adds that Cruz is a “born citizen” and not a naturalized citizen. She concludes that since he is “born a citizen” and not naturalized, he must be a “natural born citizen.” Her argument fails because she does not account for how “born citizens” are made. “Born citizens” may be made by American national common law, by the Fourteenth Amendment, or by Acts of Congress. Per Minor, only the ones made by American national common law are “natural-born citizens.” Those made by the Fourteenth Amendment and Acts of Congress are “citizens of the United States” at birth. So, as we can see, just being a “born citizen” or “citizen at birth” does not automatically make one a “natural born citizen.”
Squeeky Fromm’s argument that since parentage is irrelevant for “citizens at birth” under the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore it must also be irrelevant for “natural born citizens” fails for at least two reasons. First, as I have shown above, there are different types of “citizens at birth,” and that parentage might not be relevant to one type does not mean it is not relevant to another type (which is the “natural born citizen” type).
Squeeky Fromm argues that my position that if Congress makes one a “citizen” at birth, then Congress naturalized that person to be a “citizen” at birth is absurd because Congress in 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(a) passed a statute which also acts upon the “natural born citizens.” But that Congress may choose to pass a statute acting upon “natural born citizens” does not make those persons naturalized citizens. Those persons are “natural born citizen” and they do not lose that status because Congress may pass a naturalization statute which also acts upon them.
Squeeky Fromm engages in an invalid logical argument, arguing: All "natural born citizens" are "citizens at birth," and since Ted Cruz is a "citizen at birth," he is a "natural born Citizen." As I have shown above, this argument violates the rule of the undistributed middle. It is also fallacious for affirming the consequent. As I have already explained, Jack Maskell commits the same logical errors. She also commits logical error when she argues: All “natural born citizens are not naturalized citizens. Since Ted Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, he is a “natural born citizen.” She does not understand that we cannot arrive at an affirmative conclusion by way of one or two negative premises.
Squeeky Fromm argues that “natural born citizens” are not naturalized citizens. Citizens “may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” She adds that Cruz is a “born citizen” and not a naturalized citizen. She concludes that since he is “born a citizen” and not naturalized, he must be a “natural born citizen.” Her argument fails because she does not account for how “born citizens” are made. “Born citizens” may be made by American national common law, by the Fourteenth Amendment, or by Acts of Congress. Per Minor, only the ones made by American national common law are “natural-born citizens.” Those made by the Fourteenth Amendment and Acts of Congress are “citizens of the United States” at birth. So, as we can see, just being a “born citizen” or “citizen at birth” does not automatically make one a “natural born citizen.”
Squeeky Fromm’s argument that since parentage is irrelevant for “citizens at birth” under the Fourteenth Amendment, therefore it must also be irrelevant for “natural born citizens” fails for at least two reasons. First, as I have shown above, there are different types of “citizens at birth,” and that parentage might not be relevant to one type does not mean it is not relevant to another type (which is the “natural born citizen” type).
Squeeky Fromm begs the question that the Fourteenth Amendment
defines a “natural born citizen.” She may say it, but she does not prove it. Actually, the Fourteenth Amendment is a
red herring when it comes to defining a “natural born citizen.” Why do I say that the Fourteenth Amendment is
a red herring when it comes to defining an Article II “natural born Citizen?” People like Squeeky Fromm love to use the
Fourteenth Amendment as support in the “natural born Citizen” debate. The amendment provides them with a moral
argument for their definition of a “natural born Citizen” which has a great
appeal with the American public. That
moral appeal is based on the history and purpose of the amendment. We cannot forget that Congress passed the
amendment as part of its Reconstruction after the Civil War. It was to guarantee, among various things,
the freed slaves citizenship through birth in the United States. The amendment was designed to put an end for
good to the Dred Scott decision, which had denied freed blacks the right to
U.S. citizenship. The amendment made
sure that no state could abridge the privileges and immunities enjoyed by
“citizens of the United States.” The
amendment also introduced the concept of due process as the protector of life,
liberty, and property from abusive state action (the Fifth Amendment prohibits
the federal government from depriving one of due process), and obligated the
states to extend equal protection of the laws to any person present within its
jurisdiction. The Amendment came to be
used as a primary tool to combat racism and discrimination, not only against
blacks, but all people who suffered such illegal activities at the hands of any
state. So the amendment is not only
connected to citizenship, but it is also supposed to protect our freedom and
secure many rights of the individual.
With all that, the amendment packs a strong emotional punch. So, people like Squeeky Fromm have found a
great friend in the Fourteenth Amendment in their attempt to convince people
that the amendment defines a “natural born citizen.”
The problem for Squeeky
Fromm is that while the amendment defines two classes of citizenship, federal
and state, and has done great things for protecting life, liberty, and
property, and the civil rights of all persons present on American territory, it
has nothing to do with defining a “natural born Citizen.” But that surely does not stop Squeeky Fromm
from using the amendment when it comes to providing us with a definition of a
“natural born Citizen.” After all, how
could she pass it up after all it has done for the betterment of American
society? So people like Squeeky Fromm
will continue to tell the public how could anyone dare believe that a “natural
born citizen” is not defined by that amendment which does so much to protect
our American way of life.
But the simple
truth is that Squeeky Fromm conflates and confounds a “citizen” under the
amendment with an Article II “natural born citizen.” Anyone who will just stop and read the amendment
can readily see that it does not even mention the clause “natural born
Citizen.” Rather, it mentions “citizen
of the United States,” which citizenship status Article II, Section 1, Clause 5
tells us is no longer sufficient for one to be eligible to be President
today. If one also looks further into
the amendment, one will learn that it neither repealed nor amended Article II’s
“natural born Citizen” clause and therefore left that clause to be defined as
it had always been defined under American national common law. And that definition is, as confirmed by the
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in Minor and the majority and dissent in Wong Kim
Ark, a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens” at the time
of the child’s birth.
Squeeky Fromm argues that there is no sign of Emer de Vattel post Wong Kim Ark and therefore Vattel is dead. This is false. Minor’s definition of a “natural-born citizen,” being a paraphrase of Vattel’s The Law of Nations (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758), comes from Vattel. Wong Kim Ark did not disturb that definition nor did it have to in order to find that Wong was a “citizen of the United States” at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor has any other decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Hence, Vattel still lives and reigns after Wong Kim Ark and even to the present.
Squeeky Fromm also fails to understand this fundamental truth--that one becomes at once a “citizen at birth” and does not need naturalization does not mean that one was not naturalized. See Calvin’s Case (1608) which was decided in England in 1608. That case proves that being a “citizen at birth” can entail having been naturalized at birth which necessarily excludes one from being a true “natural born citizen.” Calvin was born to Scottish parents in the country of Scotland, after 1603, the year in which the English throne under the Tudor dynasty descended to the Stuart King, James VI of Scotland, making him James I, King of both England and Scotland. Since Calvin was born after 1603, he was considered a postnati. The English Parliament for political and social reasons refused to naturalize the Scottish Calvin as an English “natural born subject” by statute. Since Parliament would not naturalize him by statute, it was decided by the King’s men that they would get the courts to do so by common law (judge made law). Lord Coke found that under natural law Calvin at birth, having been born in the King’s dominion (Scotland), owed natural allegiance to James as King of England and Scotland, by owing that allegiance to the natural body (as distinguished from his political body and the laws of England that came with it) of the King who reigned over both kingdoms. So because Calvin owed natural allegiance to the natural body of the King and that natural King also ruled over England, Lord Coke found that Calvin also owed allegiance to the King as King of England. So it did not matter that Calvin at birth was not bound by the laws of England. What mattered was that by natural law he was bound by natural allegiance to the King who also ruled over England. Lord Coke then, from the single circumstance of Calvin being born in the King’s dominion, naturalized Calvin at birth vis-a'-vis England and ruled that he was a “natural born subject” of England. Calvin’s Scottish parents (the antenati) were eventually naturalized by statute as English subjects. Calvin’s case proves the fundamental rule that gaining subject status at birth under the English common law rather than a statute does not prove that one is a “natural born citizen,” for that status was gained through judicial naturalization at birth See also Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Section 214 Naturalisation (1758) (correctly understanding Calvin’s Case said: “Finally, there are states, as, for instance, England, where the single circumstance of being born in the country naturalises the children of a foreigner”); Wong Kim Ark (said that persons who are born abroad to U.S “citizen” parents and who are U.S. citizens at birth are nevertheless so naturalized by Congressional Acts; Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815(1971) (considers persons born abroad to U.S. citizen parents who are citizens at birth to be naturalized at birth; J. Black dissenting in Bellei also said: "All means of obtaining American citizenship which are dependent on congressional enactment are forms of naturalization").
IV.
On July 14, 2013, Squeeky Fromm took another
jab at my Jack Maskell refutation. She
says:
“You see the same thing when Mario
Apuzzo, Esq. tries to cobble Logical Syllogisms into his Birther legal theories
when such techniques are totally inappropriate in situations where the major
premises themselves which [sic] are at issue. (See Note 1, below.)
Note 1. For an example of Apuzzo’s
sashay into Putative Pedantics, see:http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/06/12/mario-apuzzo-esq-s-distributed-muddle/
.”
Squeeky Fromm read my article entitled ,
The Fallacies of Congressional
Legislative Attorney Jack Maskell’s Definition of a “Natural Born
Citizen,” accessed at http://puzo1.blogspot.com/2013/06/the-fallacies-of-congressional.html
. She learned something about logic
from my article. Now she attempts to use
that little bit that she learned to sound authoritative and show that she won
the argument.
I clearly stated the two possible
sources for Jack Maskell’s erroneous conclusion that Barack Obama is a “natural
born citizen.”
The first source rests on invalid logical
argument. We can all agree on the
statement that all “natural born citizens” are born citizens. From this truism, Maskell wants us to believe
that since Barack Obama is a born citizen, he is also a “natural born
citizen.” This is a logically invalid
argument. It is as invalid as arguing
that all poodles are dogs, and since Bubbles is a dog, Bubbles is a
poodle. The fallacy is clear to see once
identified. The problem with these
fallacious arguments is in recognizing them when someone is trying to give us a
snow job.
The second source is based on unsound
logical argument. An argument can be logically
valid but unsound (false). This occurs
when the argument is valid as to its form, but upon investigation, one learns that
either the major or minor premise is false which produces a false conclusion. In my article, I took Maskell’s invalid
argument and made it into a valid one by presenting it in a valid logical form. Thus I produced:
All born citizens are “natural born
citizens.”
Obama is a born citizen.
Therefore, Obama is a “natural born
citizen.”
I demonstrated that while this argument
is valid as to its form, it is unsound because the major premise, All born
citizens are “natural born citizens,” is false.
It is false because the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers wrote “natural
born citizen,” not “born citizen.” It is
false because just being born a citizen has never been the test for being a
“natural born citizen.” The expression
born citizen does not tell us how one becomes a born citizen. It does not tell us who shall be said to be a
born citizen. It does not tell us what
the facts and circumstances are which the definition of a “natural born
citizen” states are necessary and sufficient to make one a born citizen and
therefore a “natural born citizen.” No
U.S. Supreme Court has ever defined a “natural born citizen” by saying that
anyone who is a born citizen is a “natural born citizen.” There simply is no U.S. Supreme Court case
that supports such a proposition.
Congress has never defined a “natural born citizen” as simply anyone who
is born a citizen. In other words,
neither Jack Maskell nor anyone else has presented historical and legal
evidence which demonstrates that all born citizens are “natural born
citizens.” On the contrary, I have shown
that there has only ever been one definition of a “natural born citizen” and
that is a child born in the country to parents who were its “citizens” at the
time of the child’s birth. This
definition is, indeed, a real definition, for it provides those facts and
circumstance which must be met in order for one to be a “natural born
citizen.”
Squeeky Fromm also tells us that no one
ever heard of Emer de Vattel and that he is a non-figure when it comes to
defining a “natural born citizen.” She adds:
“1. Most of us have some memory of high
school civics class, and no memory whatsoever of anybody called Emer de Vattel.
The Birthers try to supplant our non-existent memory with false memories of
Vattel and his alleged two citizen parents theory of natural born citizenship.
There are actually some people who now claim to remember being taught about
Vattel in this light, and absolutely NO TEXTBOOKS which support that memory.”
Apart from all the extant historical
evidence which proves Squeeky Fromm to be wrong about the definition of a “natural
born citizen” and Vattel’s connection to that definition, there are numerous
cases which show her to be wrong.
See:
1. Emer
de Vattel, The Law of Nations,
Section 212 Citizens and natives (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758): “The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those
born in the country, of parents who are citizens.’”
2. The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253,
289 (1814) (C.J. Marshall concurring): “Vattel,
who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory
on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says ‘The citizens
are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties,
and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The
natives or indigenes [having equivalent meaning to "natural-born
citizens”] are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society
not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the
citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and
succeed to all their rights.’”
3. Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor,
28 U.S. 99 (1830):
“II. The second general question is,
whether John Inglis, the demandant, was or was not capable of taking lands in
the state of New York by descent.
This question is presented under
several aspects, for the purpose of meeting what at present from the evidence
appears a little uncertain, as to the time of the birth of John Inglis. This
question as here presented, does not call upon the court for an opinion upon
the broad doctrine of allegiance and the right of expatriation, under a settled
and unchanged state of society and government. But to decide what are the
rights of the individuals composing that society, and living under the
protection of that government, when a revolution occurs; a dismemberment takes
place; new governments are formed; and new relations between the government and
the people are established.”
After stating
that the English common law broad allegiance no longer applied to the new
America after the Revolution, it held:
“2. If born [in New York] after the 4th of July 1776, and before the 15th of September of the same year, when the British took possession of New York, his infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself, and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his minority; which never having been done, he remains a British subject, and disabled from inheriting the land in question.”
Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 120-27, 3 Pet. 99. (1830). Rejecting the English common law jus soli rule and the rule of perpetual allegiance that may have prevailed in a state unless abrogated by statute and used for deciding questions of inheritance of lands located within a state’s jurisdiction, which rules were adopted by Justice Johnson and Justice Story in their concurring opinions, and rather adopting the national jus sanguinis rule of the law of nations, the Court held that if the child was born in New York when it was a new state to alien parents, the child followed the condition of his alien father, which could have been cast off at the age of majority, and never having been done the son was therefore neither a “natural born Citizen” nor a “citizen of the United States,” but rather alien born. So, even though the child was born in New York after the Revolution, the U.S. Supreme Court, regardless of what the common or statutory law of New York might have been on the subject of allegiance, still ruled that the child was alien born, because the father was an alien at the time of the child’s birth.
“2. If born [in New York] after the 4th of July 1776, and before the 15th of September of the same year, when the British took possession of New York, his infancy incapacitated him from making any election for himself, and his election and character followed that of his father, subject to the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the termination of his minority; which never having been done, he remains a British subject, and disabled from inheriting the land in question.”
Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 120-27, 3 Pet. 99. (1830). Rejecting the English common law jus soli rule and the rule of perpetual allegiance that may have prevailed in a state unless abrogated by statute and used for deciding questions of inheritance of lands located within a state’s jurisdiction, which rules were adopted by Justice Johnson and Justice Story in their concurring opinions, and rather adopting the national jus sanguinis rule of the law of nations, the Court held that if the child was born in New York when it was a new state to alien parents, the child followed the condition of his alien father, which could have been cast off at the age of majority, and never having been done the son was therefore neither a “natural born Citizen” nor a “citizen of the United States,” but rather alien born. So, even though the child was born in New York after the Revolution, the U.S. Supreme Court, regardless of what the common or statutory law of New York might have been on the subject of allegiance, still ruled that the child was alien born, because the father was an alien at the time of the child’s birth.
4. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. 242,
245 (1830): As we saw above, in Inglis,
Justice Story was in the minority on the question of whether the demandant was
a citizen of the State of New York and thus a U.S. citizen. Relying upon the English common law jus soli
rule, he had ruled that if born in New York after July 4, 1776, but before the
15th of September of the same year, when the British took possession of New
York, he was a U.S. citizen even though his father was a British subject. But in Shanks, which was decided after
Inglis, he accepted that the American Revolution changed the rules of allegiance in the new America and changed his position on allegiance and U.S. citizenship. Here he started by saying:
“After
the elaborate opinions expressed in the case of Inglis vs. The Trustees of the
Sailor’s Snug Harbour, ante p. 99, upon the question of alienage, growing out
of the American Revolution; it is unnecessary to do more in delivering the
opinion of the court in the present case, than to state, in a brief manner, the
grounds on which our decision is founded.”
Justice
Story, adopting the Inglis majority position which rejected the jus soli (citizenship
through place of birth) of the English common law and accepted the jus
sanguinis (citizenship inherited from parents) of the law of nations, then went
on to explain:
“If she
was not of age, then she might well be deemed under the circumstances of this
case to hold the citizenship of her father, for children born in a country,
continuing while under age in the family of the father, partake of his national
character as a citizen of that country.” Justice Johnson, dissenting for other
reasons, said that Ann Scott (married Ann Shanks) “was a native born citizen of
South Carolina, daughter of a native born citizen of North Carolina,” and that
her being a citizen of South Carolina at the moment of her birth was
established by the “leading maxim[] of common law,” “proles sequitur sortem
paternam,” which means “the offspring follows the condition of the father.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1091 (5th ed. 1979).
5. Barry
v. Mercein, 46 U. S. 103 (1847): Argument
of counsel for John A. Barry, a British “natural born subject:”
“4. The plaintiff in error being of legeance to the crown of England, his child, though born in the United States during his father’s temporary residence therein – twenty-two months and twenty days – not withstanding its mother be an American citizen, is not a citizen of the United States. It is incapacitate by its infancy from making any present election, follows the legeance of its father, partus sequitur patrem, and is a British subject. The father being domiciled and resident within the dominions of Her Britannic Majesty, such is also the proper and rightful domicil of his wife and child, and he has a legal right to remove them thither. The child being detained from the father, its natural guardian and protector, without authority of law, and writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is his appropriate legal remedy for its restoration to him from its present illegal detention and restraint. Constitution United States, art. 3, sec. 2; Judiciary Act, 1789, sec. 11; Inglis v. Trustees Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 3 Peters, 99; 7 Anne, cap. 5; 4 Geo. III. cap. 21; Warrender v. Warrender, 2 Clar. & Fin. Ap. Ca. 523; Story’s Confl. Laws, 30, 36, 43, 74, 160; Shelford on Marriage, Ferg. Rep. 397, 398.”
6. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 476-77 (1857) (J. Daniel
concurring): The decision only dealt with the question of whether Dred
Scott was a “citizen of the United States.”
Nevertheless, Justice Daniel, concurring, defined a “natural born citizen.” While as repugnant as slavery was and
still is, no court or amendment has over turned the meaning of “natural-born
citizen” from Dred Scott as described by Justice Daniel nor has there
ever been a need to do so. The main point is that in deciding what a
"citizen" was in 1856, both the majority and dissent went back to
1787 to examine what the Framers and the people of that time considered a
"citizen" to be. The Court said that the Constitution must be
understood now as it was understood at the time it was written. The
judges did not disagree that one had to look back to the Founders. What they disagreed on is what the public
opinion was at that time as to whether a freed slave was a “citizen.” In this regard, we know that the Court’s holding
that freed slaves were not “citizens of the United States” was overruled by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Thirteenth (ratified in 1865) and Fourteenth (ratified
in 1868) Amendment, none of which repealed or amended Article II’s “natural
born Citizen” clause.
As to the “natural born Citizen”
clause, Justice Daniel said:
“The citizens are the members of the
civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its
authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are
those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As society cannot perpetuate itself otherwise
than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the
condition of their parents, and succeed to all their rights.” Again:
I say, to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who
is a citizen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place
of his birth, and not his country.”
(quoting and citing Emer de Vattel, The
Law of Nations, Section 212 (London 1797) (1st ed. Neuchatel 1758)). It
should be noted that Justice Daniel took out of Vattel’s definition the
reference to “fathers” and “father” and replaced it with “parents” and
“person,” respectively. It is true that
it was only Justice Daniel in his concurrence that defined a “natural born
Citizen” the way he did. But on more
than one occasion, the United States Supreme Court has defined what a
"natural born Citizen" is. Justice
Daniel’s definition of a “natural born Citizen” was first confirmed by Chief
Justice John Marshall in The Venus (1814) and later confirmed by the unanimous
Court in Minor and both the majority and dissent in Wong Kim Ark. To this day, that definition has never been
changed.
7.
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 168-170 (1875): The
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court explained: “The Constitution does not, in
words, say who shall be natural-born citizens." Hence, the Court
said that neither the original Constitution nor the Fourteenth Amendment
(ratified in 1868) defined a "natural born citizen." In
fact, there is nothing in the text of or debates on the Fourteenth Amendment
which in any way suggests that it amended Article II and its "natural
born citizen" clause. The Court said that the Amendment
did not add to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the people prior to the
adoption of that Amendment. We know that these privileges and
immunities enjoyed as a citizen of a state had been protected from
state deprivation by Article IV and privileges and immunities enjoyed as a
citizen of the United States were now also protected from state abridgement by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, the
Amendment could not have granted the privilege and right of being elected to
the Office of President to persons who did not have that privilege and right
prior to its adoption.
The Court then further explained that since the Constitution did not provide the meaning of a "natural born citizen,"
"[r]esort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [p168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. ”
Id. at 167-68.
Hence, a child born in a country to parents who were its “citizens” was not only a “citizen” like them, but also a “natural-born citizen,” which maybe his or her parents were not. Under that same common law, all the rest of the people were "aliens or foreigners," who the Court later explained could become "citizens of the United States" by satisfying naturalization Acts of Congress or maybe the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also sua sponte stated that "some authorities" went further and included as "citizens" children "born within the jurisdiction" to alien parents. The Court said that while "there have been doubts" about whether such children born in the United States to alien parents were "citizens," there never had been any doubts that children born in the country to citizens parents, who the Court called "natural-born citizens," were "citizens." So the Court basically said that with the "natural born citizens," there were no doubts that they were "citizens." But with non-"natural born citizens," such as children born in the United States to alien parents, who could look to no other law other than the Fourteenth Amendment to gain U.S. citizenship status, there could be doubts about whether they were even just "citizens." So, exactly from where did the citizenship doubts to which the Court was referring come? They surely did not come from the English common law which based on birthright, naturalized at birth as "natural-born subjects" children born in the King's dominion to alien parents. So the Court could not have been looking to the English common law for its definition of a "natural born citizen," for that law provided no doubt as to the "natural-born subject" status of children born in the King's dominion to alien parents. Also, the Court's doubts could not have come from the common law to which the Court said the Framers looked for their definition of a "natural born citizen," for under that common law there was no doubt that such children were not "natural born citizens." Rather, those doubts came from the new Fourteenth Amendment and its ambiguous "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause, which the U.S. Supreme Court in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) (virtually the same Court as the Minor Court) said excluded from U.S. citizenship children born in the United States to alien parents. So these Fourteenth Amendment potential citizens could not be "natural born citizens" under Minor's formulation, for there was no doubt that they did not meet its common law definition of the clause. They also could not even just be "citizens of the United States" under the English common law, for that law had no application in national U.S. citizenship. The doubts were whether they could be plain "citizens of the United States" under the Fourteenth Amendment. With Virginia Minor being born in the country to "citizen" parents and thus a "natural born citizen," which without any doubt made her a "citizen" and therefore qualified to receive the privileges and immunities available under Article IV and the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court eventually held did not include the right to vote), Minor said that it was not necessary to resolve the question that it raised about Fourteenth Amendment citizenship. U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) eventually resolved this question. See my discussion below on Wong Kim Ark.
"[r]esort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [p168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. ”
Id. at 167-68.
Hence, a child born in a country to parents who were its “citizens” was not only a “citizen” like them, but also a “natural-born citizen,” which maybe his or her parents were not. Under that same common law, all the rest of the people were "aliens or foreigners," who the Court later explained could become "citizens of the United States" by satisfying naturalization Acts of Congress or maybe the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also sua sponte stated that "some authorities" went further and included as "citizens" children "born within the jurisdiction" to alien parents. The Court said that while "there have been doubts" about whether such children born in the United States to alien parents were "citizens," there never had been any doubts that children born in the country to citizens parents, who the Court called "natural-born citizens," were "citizens." So the Court basically said that with the "natural born citizens," there were no doubts that they were "citizens." But with non-"natural born citizens," such as children born in the United States to alien parents, who could look to no other law other than the Fourteenth Amendment to gain U.S. citizenship status, there could be doubts about whether they were even just "citizens." So, exactly from where did the citizenship doubts to which the Court was referring come? They surely did not come from the English common law which based on birthright, naturalized at birth as "natural-born subjects" children born in the King's dominion to alien parents. So the Court could not have been looking to the English common law for its definition of a "natural born citizen," for that law provided no doubt as to the "natural-born subject" status of children born in the King's dominion to alien parents. Also, the Court's doubts could not have come from the common law to which the Court said the Framers looked for their definition of a "natural born citizen," for under that common law there was no doubt that such children were not "natural born citizens." Rather, those doubts came from the new Fourteenth Amendment and its ambiguous "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" clause, which the U.S. Supreme Court in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) (virtually the same Court as the Minor Court) said excluded from U.S. citizenship children born in the United States to alien parents. So these Fourteenth Amendment potential citizens could not be "natural born citizens" under Minor's formulation, for there was no doubt that they did not meet its common law definition of the clause. They also could not even just be "citizens of the United States" under the English common law, for that law had no application in national U.S. citizenship. The doubts were whether they could be plain "citizens of the United States" under the Fourteenth Amendment. With Virginia Minor being born in the country to "citizen" parents and thus a "natural born citizen," which without any doubt made her a "citizen" and therefore qualified to receive the privileges and immunities available under Article IV and the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment (which the Court eventually held did not include the right to vote), Minor said that it was not necessary to resolve the question that it raised about Fourteenth Amendment citizenship. U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) eventually resolved this question. See my discussion below on Wong Kim Ark.
8. Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F.Cas.
582, 5 Dill. 394, No. 11,719 (C.C.W.D.Ark 1879): The
Circuit Court of the Western District of Arkansas explained:
“[W]hen
the question arises as to what people a person belongs, what rule is to govern
in the solution of the problem?
There
is no statute law on the subject. We find that the question before the country
at one time, as to who was a white person and who was a member of the African
race, was solved by legislative or constitutional
enactments defining the nationality of persons according to the quantum of
white or African blood in the veins of the persons.
These
laws were all enactments of the states, and had reference to the African race
alone. The United States never had any statute law on the subject (and has not
now) with regard to persons who are not subject to its jurisdiction. Now, in
this case, as the 38th article of the treaty only permits an American citizen,
or a white person, to expatriate himself -- to throw off his allegiance to the
government of the United States -- and place himself beyond the jurisdiction of
its courts by marriage to a Choctaw and residence in their country, we must
somewhere find a rule to define who is a Choctaw, in [**15]
a case where there is mixed parentage. Does the quantum of Indian blood in the
veins of the party determine the fact as to whether such party is of the white
or Indian race? If so, how much Indian blood does it take to make an Indian, or
how much white blood to make a person a member of the body politic known as
American citizens? Where do we find any rule on the subject which makes the
quantum of blood the standard of nationality? Certainly not from the statute
law of the United States; nor is it to be found in the common law. In the case
of United States v. Sanders [Case No. 16,220], the court held that the quantum
of Indian blood in the veins did not determine the condition of the offspring
of a union between a white person and an Indian; but further held that the condition
of the mother did determine the question. And the court referred to the common
law as authority for the position that the condition of the mother fixed the
status of the offspring. The court is sustained in the first position by the
common law, and also in the last position, if applied to the offspring of a
connection between a freeman and a slave, upon the principle handed down from
the Roman civil law, [**16] that the
owner of a female animal is entitled to all her brood, according to the maxim
partus sequitur ventrem. But by the common law this rule is reversed with
regard to the offspring of free persons. Their offspring follows the condition
of the father, and the rule partus sequitur patrem prevails in determining
their status. 1 Bouv. Inst., 198, § 502; 31 Barb. 486; 2 Bouv. Law Dict. 147;
Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. [28 U.S.] 242. This is the universal maxim of the
common law with regard to freemen -- as old as the common law, or even as the
Roman civil law, and as well settled as the rule partus sequitur ventrem -- the
one being a rule fixing the status of freemen; the other being a rule defining
the ownership of property -- the one applicable to different political
communities or states, whose citizens are in the enjoyment of the civil rights
possessed by people in a state of freedom; the other defining the condition of
the offspring which had been tainted by the bondage of the mother.
No
other rules than the ones above enumerated ever did prevail in this or any
other civilized country. In the case of Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486, the
court says: "The universal maxim of [**17]
the common law being partus sequitur patrem, it is sufficient for the
application of this doctrine that the father should be a subject lawfully, and
without breach of his allegiance beyond sea, no matter what may be the
condition of the mother."
The
law of nations, which becomes, when applicable to an existing condition of
affairs in a country, a part of the common law of that country, declares the
same rule. Vattel, in his Law of Nations (page 101), says: "As the society
cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the
citizens, these children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and
succeed to their rights. * * * The country of the father is, therefore, that of
the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit
consent." Again, on page 102, Vattel says: "By the law of nature
alone, children follow the condition of their fathers and enter into all their
rights." This law of nature, as far as it has become a part of the common
law, in the absence of any positive enactment on the subject, must be the rule
in this case.”
Id. at 585, 18 Alb.Law J. 14-17 (cited
with approval in United States v. Ward, 42 F.320; 1890 U.S. App. LEXIS
1586; 14 Sawy. 472 (C.C. S.D.Cal 1890) and Keith
v. United States, 8 Okla. 446, 448, 58 P. 507
(1899)).
9. Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N.Y. 356
(1883): “Vattel says: ‘ Society not
being able to subsist and perpetuate itself, but by the children of its
citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and
succeed to all their rights.’ B. 1, ch. 19, § 212.”
10. United States v. Ward, 42 F.320
(C.C.S.D.Cal. 1890): “By the common law this rule [partus sequitur ventrem] is
reversed with regard to the offspring of free persons. Their offspring follows
the condition of the father, and the rule partus sequitur patrem prevails in
determining their status. 1 Bouv. Inst., 198, § 502; 31 Barb. 486; 2 Bouv. Law
Dict. 147; Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. [28 U.S.] 242. This is the universal maxim
of the common law with regard to freemen -- as old as the common law, or even
as the Roman civil law, and as well settled as the rule partus sequitur ventrem
-- the one being a rule fixing the status of freemen; the other being a rule
defining the ownership of property -- the one applicable to different political
communities or states, whose citizens are in the enjoyment of the civil rights
possessed by people in a state of freedom; the other defining the condition of
the offspring which had been tainted by the bondage of the mother.
No
other rules than the ones above enumerated ever did prevail in this or any
other civilized country. In the case of Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486,
the court says: ‘The universal maxim of the common law being partus
sequitur patrem, it is sufficient for the application of this doctrine that the
father should be a subject lawfully, and without breach of his allegiance
beyond sea, no matter what may be the condition of the mother.’
The
law of nations, which becomes, when applicable to an existing condition of
affairs in a country, a part of the common law of that country, declares the
same rule. Vattel, in his Law of Nations (page 101), says: ‘As the society
cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the
citizens, these children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and
succeed to their rights. * * * The country of the father is, therefore, that of
the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent.’
Again, on page 102, Vattel says: ‘By the law of nature alone, children follow
the condition of their fathers and enter into all their rights.’ This law of nature,
as far as it has become a part of the common law, in the absence of any
positive enactment on the subject, must be the rule in this case.”
11. United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169
U.S. 649, 679-80 (1898): Confirmed Minor’s
“natural-born citizen” definition when it said: “'At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers
of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born
in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their
birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as
distinguished from aliens or foreigners” (citing and quoting Minor), and
not being limited by the definition of a “natural-born citizen” when defining
who a “citizen” was under the Fourteenth Amendment, held that a child born in
the United States to domiciled and resident alien parents was a “citizen” under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Wong Kim Ark eventually resolved Minor's open question, holding that a child born in the United States to permanently domiciled and resident alien parents was a "citizen of the United States" from the moment of birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is critically constitutionally important to understand that the Court held Wong to be a "citizen" under the Fourteenth Amendment. It did not hold that he was a "natural born citizen" under the common law with which the Framers were familiar when they drafted the Constitution and which according to Minor provided the definition of a "natural born citizen."
People like Squeeky Fromm also use Wong Kim Ark to tell us about how the decision so well met the needs of our nation of immigrants who have come to our shores thirsting for freedom and opportunity, mixing that noble goal into the definition of a “natural born citizen.” The simple response to this “feel good” argument is that immigrants coming to America are looking to become “citizens,” not “natural born citizens,” which is a status that their children can enjoy like the children of the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers enjoyed. Hence, this appeal to tradition is nothing but a fallacious argument applied to the definition of a “natural born citizen.”
Wong Kim Ark eventually resolved Minor's open question, holding that a child born in the United States to permanently domiciled and resident alien parents was a "citizen of the United States" from the moment of birth by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is critically constitutionally important to understand that the Court held Wong to be a "citizen" under the Fourteenth Amendment. It did not hold that he was a "natural born citizen" under the common law with which the Framers were familiar when they drafted the Constitution and which according to Minor provided the definition of a "natural born citizen."
People like Squeeky Fromm also use Wong Kim Ark to tell us about how the decision so well met the needs of our nation of immigrants who have come to our shores thirsting for freedom and opportunity, mixing that noble goal into the definition of a “natural born citizen.” The simple response to this “feel good” argument is that immigrants coming to America are looking to become “citizens,” not “natural born citizens,” which is a status that their children can enjoy like the children of the Founders, Framers, and Ratifiers enjoyed. Hence, this appeal to tradition is nothing but a fallacious argument applied to the definition of a “natural born citizen.”
Despite Squeeky
Fromm’s lack of memory of who Emer de Vattel was, all these decisions from our
U.S. Supreme Court and these lower courts confirmed Vattel’s Section 212
definition of the “natural-born citizens” as “those born in the country, of
parents who are citizens.” This is the only definition of the clause that
has ever existed and which has been recognized by our U.S. Supreme Court.
The conditions of being born in the country to “citizen” parents are both
necessary and sufficient conditions of being a “natural born Citizen.”
The definition of a “natural born Citizen” therefore excludes anyone who is
either not born in the country (or its jurisdictional equivalent) or not born
to parents (both parents) who are its “citizens” at the time of the child’s
birth or both.
Squeeky Fromm takes the second part of
my article, the one related to an unsound argument, and presents herself as
some authority on the matter. She
presents a statement suggesting that I, the one who raised and discussed the
issue in the first place, do not recognize the issue concerning the truth of
the major premise. I clearly not only
recognized the issue, I created it as part of my logical analysis. I also demonstrated, as can be seen above, how
there is no truth to the Jack Maskell thesis that all born citizens are
“natural born citizens.” I did all that
so that the public can see how Jack Maskell ultimately is wrong in his
argument.
V.
Squeeky
Fromm’s most recent foray is bringing Trayvon Martin into the “natural born
citizen” debate. In her article, The George Zimmerman Verdict and Birtherism,
at http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/07/16/the-george-zimmerman-verdict-and-birtherism/ , she argues
that Birthers are like “Trayvonites.” She argues that the Zimmerman verdict was
correct because the rule of law and the right to self-defense required it, but
that Trayvon Martin’s supporters refuse to see the light. What Squeeky Fromm fails to understand is
that the Constitutionalists (whom she calls the “Birthers”) have taken the
position that they have because of the Constitution and the rule of law. What is ironic is that a commenter on her
blog, “Joel Lawler,” has attacked her as being a racist for her pro-Zimmerman
position. He has told her to “take a
deep look into your own sad racist soul.”
She defends her position, saying that the evidence and law require
it. So here we see Squeeky Fromm arguing
that such decisions must be decided by the Constitution and the rule of law and
not by other extraneous factors such as emotion, anger, prejudice, or
revenge. But she does not grant the “Birthers”
the same right to argue that Obama is not a “natural born Citizen.” We can only conclude from Squeeky Fromm’s
inconsistent positions that the Constitution and the rule of law count for her only
when it is politically expedient that they do so.
So,
Squeeky Fromm has failed to discredit my Jack Maskell refutation in her several
articles (the links are above). She
continues to embarrass herself with her own artistic muddle. She understands what the Constitution and the
rule of law mean, but she applies them selectively and only for political expediency.
In referring to the topic of her gaslighting
article ( http://birtherthinktank.wordpress.com/2013/07/14/are-the-birthers-gaslighting-themselves/
) blogger
ppsimmons, this is what Squeeky Fromm ironically said to one of her
sycophants:
"Hi FrankB!!!
Thank you!!! Somebody had to
de-construct him. Why do these guys try to put on airs like they know what they
are talking about??? All they do is make trouble for themselves.”
Too bad that Artsy Fartsy Squeeky Fromm Girl
Reporter does not follow her own advice.
Mario Apuzzo,
Esq.
July 19, 2013
Updated March 8, 2014
Updated March 8, 2014
####
Copyright © 2013
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved
Mario Apuzzo, Esq.
All Rights Reserved